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This Article examines the role of lower-court precedent in the US Supreme 
Court’s decisions. The Supreme Court is rarely the first court to consider a legal 
question, and therefore the Court has the opportunity to be informed by and per-
haps even persuaded by the views of the various lower courts that have previously 
addressed the issue. This Article considers whether the Court should give weight to 
lower-court precedent as a matter of normative theory and whether the Court in 
fact does so as a matter of practice. To answer the normative question, this Article 
analyzes a variety of potential reasons to give weight to lower-court precedent, in-
cluding reasons related to stability, constraint, and the wisdom of crowds. To ad-
dress the descriptive question, this Article examines the current justices’ voting be-
havior and reasoning, over a period of several recent years, in cases in which the 
Court resolved splits in the lower courts. The Article’s conclusions shed light on 
broader debates over interpretive methodology and the Supreme Court’s role as the 
manager of a large judicial system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The US Supreme Court is almost never the first court to con-
sider a question. By the time a question makes its way to the 
Court, it will often have been debated and decided by numerous 
lower courts over a period of years, sometimes decades.1 Nobody 
would argue that the Supreme Court should be bound, as a formal 
matter, by lower-court precedents. Still, if the lower courts have 
 
 1 See, for example, Hertz Corp v Friend, 559 US 77, 89–93 (2010) (describing fifty 
years of controversy in the lower courts over the meaning of “principal place of business” 
in 28 USC § 1332 and finally resolving the matter); Smith v City of Jackson, Mississippi, 
544 US 228, 230, 236–38 (2005) (deciding whether a disparate-impact theory of recovery 
is available under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, a question that 
lower courts had debated for decades). 
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overwhelmingly decided a question in a certain way, should the 
Supreme Court give their views some genuine weight, even if 
the Court’s own independent judgment leans in the other direc-
tion? Or should the Court act as if it were writing on a blank 
slate, as if it were offering the first word as well as the last? 
Should the answer depend on the circumstances, and if so, 
which circumstances matter and why? 
The Supreme Court has neither a solid theory nor a steady 
practice when it comes to using lower-court precedent. In read-
ing the Court’s opinions, one sometimes finds statements to the 
effect that a particular decision accords with, or departs from, 
the views of most of the lower courts.2 These statements, whether 
found in the majority opinion or in separate concurrences or dis-
sents, are sometimes offered in passing, as if casually observing 
a coincidence. But in other instances the views of the lower 
courts are presented as if they play a more important role in the 
analysis, as if they hold some degree of authority. That is, some 
opinions suggest that the Supreme Court decided the question 
in a certain way (or should have decided it in a certain way) be-
cause most of the lower courts had done so. Many such opinions 
will be described below, but one recent example is the majority 
opinion in United States v Tinklenberg,3 which concerned the 
federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974.4 The majority found that the 
statute’s key language was facially ambiguous and then listed a 
series of six contextual considerations that together identified 
one interpretation as correct.5 The second of these considera-
tions, listed before legislative history and workability, was that 
all but one of the courts of appeals had ruled the same way, a 
factor that the Court deemed “entitled to strong consideration, 
particularly when those courts have maintained that interpreta-
tion consistently over a long [ ] period of time.”6 
When an opinion suggests that it is relying on the lower 
courts as authorities, other opinions in the same case sometimes 
 
 2 See, for example, Coleman v Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S Ct 1327, 1332 
(2012) (“In agreement with every Court of Appeals to have addressed this question, this 
Court now holds . . .”); Cullen v Pinholster, 131 S Ct 1388, 1417 (2011) (Sotomayor dis-
senting) (observing that the Court’s majority opinion “charts a [ ] novel course that, so 
far as I am aware, no court of appeals has adopted”); Abbott v United States, 131 S Ct 18, 
23 (2010) (“We hold, in accord with the courts below, and in line with the majority of the 
Courts of Appeals . . .”). 
 3 131 S Ct 2007 (2011). 
 4 Pub L No 93-619, 88 Stat 2076, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3161 et seq. 
 5 See Tinklenberg, 131 S Ct at 2013–16. 
 6 Id at 2014. 
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respond by explicitly rejecting that mode of analysis. That hap-
pened in Tinklenberg, for example,7 as well as in a case decided 
a few weeks earlier, in which the dissent’s heavy reliance on 
lower courts drew the response that the Court has “no warrant 
to ignore clear statutory language on the ground that other 
courts have done so.”8 In another recent case, the majority’s re-
peated invocations of uniform support from the federal courts of 
appeals9 prompted the dissent to answer that “we do not resolve 
questions such as the one before us by a show of hands.”10 
Another common approach to lower-court precedent is vir-
tually, or sometimes literally, to ignore it. In one recent case, the 
dissent relied on decades of practice in many district courts and 
had support from a large majority of the federal courts of ap-
peals that had addressed the question,11 but the Court’s majority 
opinion barely acknowledged that its decision went so clearly 
against the grain of that lower-court precedent.12 In other cases, 
a lengthy history of lower-court engagement with a question will 
go totally unmentioned, as if it had never happened.13 
The absence of a settled approach to dealing with the views 
of the lower courts is odd considering that the issue is so perva-
sive. Then again, perhaps the lack of a developed theory and 
consistent practice should come as no surprise, given that some 
other aspects of the Court’s decisionmaking methodology—in 
particular its approaches to constitutional and statutory 
interpretation—seem not to enjoy ordinary stare decisis effect.14 
 
 7 See id at 2018 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The 
clarity of the text is doubtless why, as the Court’s opinion points out, every Circuit dis-
agrees with the [decision under review]. . . . Clarity of text produces unanimity of Cir-
cuits—not, as the Court’s opinion would have it, unanimity of Circuits clarifies text.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 8 Milner v Department of the Navy, 131 S Ct 1259, 1268 (2011). See also id at 1269 
(“We will not flout all usual rules of statutory interpretation to take the side of the bare 
majority [of lower courts].”). 
 9 See CSX Transportation, Inc v McBride, 131 S Ct 2630, 2640–41 (2011). 
 10 Id at 2650 (Roberts dissenting). See also Global-Tech Appliances, Inc v SEB SA, 
131 S Ct 2060, 2073 (2011) (Kennedy dissenting) (“[C]ounting courts in a circuit split is 
not this Court’s usual method for deciding important questions of law.”). 
 11 See Taniguchi v Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd, 132 S Ct 1997, 2008–09, 2010–11 
(2012) (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 12 See id at 2000–01 & n 1, 2005 n 5 (majority) (observing that the circuits were 
split but citing only two conflicting decisions).  
 13 See Part III.A.2. 
 14 See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpre-
tation Methodology?, 96 Georgetown L J 1863, 1872–84 (2008) (discussing whether the 
Court grants stare decisis effect to statutory interpretation methodologies); Richard H. 
Fallon Jr, Constitutional Constraints, 97 Cal L Rev 975, 1013 (2009) (“[T]he justices have 
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If the Court can be intentionalist on Monday, textualist on 
Tuesday, and pragmatic on Wednesday, perhaps it is only natu-
ral that the Court would honor lower-court consensus one day, 
openly reject it the next day, and neglect it altogether the rest of 
the week. Moreover, the more one ponders what the Court 
should do with lower-court precedent, the more complicated and 
interesting the question becomes. The potential reasons to defer 
to lower-court precedent are multiple and diverse, as are the 
cases that the Supreme Court confronts and the jurisprudential 
commitments that the justices bring to their work, so a simple 
resolution may not be feasible. 
With the aim of illuminating this intriguing problem, this 
Article examines the Supreme Court’s treatment of lower-court 
precedent in both its normative and descriptive dimensions. 
Part I frames the inquiry, and then Part II addresses the central 
normative issues: Should the Supreme Court ever defer to lower 
courts on questions of law, and, if so, on what grounds? I present 
and evaluate half a dozen potential reasons—from stability to 
judicial constraint to the wisdom of crowds—for the Court to 
give lower-court decisions some precedential weight. In most 
cases, the argument for following the lower courts is not very 
powerful, but in a subset of cases it is. 
With the benefit of the theoretical framework developed in 
Parts I and II, Part III then examines the Court’s actual practices 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. I seek to identify every 
instance in which the Supreme Court’s opinions relied on lower-
court precedent during three recent Supreme Court terms, 
which cover the period from October 2010 through June 2013. 
For the same period, I also examine how the justices voted when 
there was a clearly prevailing view in the lower courts. These 
three terms capture the first three years of the Court as currently 
constituted—that is, since Justice Elena Kagan replaced Justice 
John Paul Stevens. There are a number of interesting findings. 
Notably, while it appears that the Court sides with the majority 
of the lower courts the majority of the time, it is not at all 
uncommon for the Court to reject positions that have enjoyed 
the support of lopsided majorities of the lower courts. There are 
also important differences among the current justices, with some 
justices ignoring or outright shunning lower-court precedent 
 
seldom exhibited much interest in attempting to bind either themselves or each other, in 
advance, to the kind of general interpretive approaches [to constitutional adjudication] 
that academic theorists champion.”). 
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even as other justices appear to accord the lower courts a meas-
ure of deference. These differences can be explained through ref-
erence to the justices’ deeper jurisprudential commitments and 
can shed light on the methodological divide between the Court’s 
conservatives and liberals. 
The Conclusion explores some broader practical and theo-
retical implications of the analysis. In particular, it addresses 
the interaction between precedent and foundational theories like 
textualism, and it considers whether a Supreme Court that is 
only sporadically attentive to lower-court precedent can avoid 
destabilizing a judicial system in which other courts use prece-
dent quite differently. 
I.  FOCUSING THE INQUIRY WITH SOME INITIAL DISTINCTIONS 
Precedent is ubiquitous in judicial decisionmaking. Once the 
inquiry is narrowed to the use of lower-court precedent by the 
Supreme Court, there still remain a variety of ways in which such 
precedent might come into play. The following sections introduce 
some distinctions among uses of lower-court precedent in order to 
focus the inquiry further. 
A. Certiorari Stage and Merits Stage 
At the outset, we should distinguish between the certiorari 
stage, the Court’s largely discretionary process for choosing 
which cases to hear, and the merits stage, at which the Court 
actually answers the legal questions that it has chosen to con-
sider. In recent years, the Court has given plenary consideration 
to only about eighty cases per term.15 Probably the most signifi-
cant factor in selecting those few cases is the presence or ab-
sence of a conflict in the lower courts on an important, recurring 
question of federal law.16 This is not to say that a split is always 
 
 15 See Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2013 Annual Report of the Di-
rector table A-1 (Administrative Office of the US Courts 2013), online at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/A01Sep13 
.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014). 
 16 See US S Ct Rule 10(a)–(b) (listing conflicts in the lower courts as grounds for 
granting certiorari). See also Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va L Rev 1567, 
1630–36 (2008) (reviewing empirical analyses showing that lower-court conflict is still 
the most important factor in granting certiorari); H.W. Perry Jr, Deciding to Decide: 
Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court 246, 251 (Harvard 1991) (deeming 
lower-court conflicts the most important factor in granting certiorari). A mere division of 
authority is not sufficient; the importance of the question presented matters too, as does 
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necessary, especially when the case involves matters of high public 
importance, but the absence of conflict weighs heavily against a 
grant of certiorari and will usually (though not always) prevent 
the Court from intervening.17 Lower-court views, particularly 
when they are unanimous, are thus honored routinely at the 
certiorari stage in the sense that they are left alone. 
This Article’s central concern, however, is the merits stage, 
and it is here that acceding to the views of inferior courts raises 
more interesting issues. Once the Court has decided to invest its 
time and effort in answering some question, is there any reason 
that it should care how the majority of the lower courts, or even 
all of them, have previously answered that question? Once the 
Court determines to reach the merits, one might suppose that it 
should simply try to decide the case correctly, according to its 
own view of the matter. It can thus be jarring to read a Supreme 
Court opinion that seems to aim at a less ambitious goal, such 
as a recent dissenting opinion that advocated following a long-
standing lower-court interpretation that was described (twice) 
merely as “reasonable,” rather than as the best or the correct in-
terpretation.18 Mere reasonableness does not sound like the 
standard that a reviewing court ordinarily demands of lower-
court determinations of law, which are reviewed de novo and 
thus theoretically without any deference.19 
Of course, “deciding correctly” is a complicated matter. Cor-
rectness might not exist in a vacuum; legal questions have his-
tories. The purpose of Part II is to consider the various ways in 
which the lower courts’ actions might help to reveal or deter-
mine the correct decision for the Supreme Court. 
B. Distinguishing among Various Uses of Lower-Court 
 
whether the issue has had a chance to mature through a bit of percolation. See Perry, 
Deciding to Decide at 230–34, 253–60 (cited in note 16). 
 17 See Perry, Deciding to Decide at 253–54, 277–79 (cited in note 16). 
 18 Milner v Department of the Navy, 131 S Ct 1259, 1275, 1278 (2011) (Breyer dis-
senting) (“[E]ven if the majority’s analysis would have persuaded me if written on a 
blank slate, [the leading lower-court opinion’s] analysis was careful and its holding reason-
able.”). See also McNally v United States, 483 US 350, 376 (1987) (Stevens dissenting) 
(“In these cases I am convinced that those [lower-court] judges correctly understood the 
intent of the Congress that enacted this statute. Even if I were not so persuaded, I could 
not join a rejection of such a long-standing, consistent interpretation of a federal statute.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 19 See 5 Am Jur 2d Appellate Review § 647 (2014). When the legal question is one 
of state law rather than federal law, the Supreme Court has sometimes deferred to lower 
federal courts. See Salve Regina College v Russell, 499 US 225, 241–42 (1991) (Rehnquist 
dissenting) (citing examples). 
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Precedent 
This Article addresses the weight that the Supreme Court 
should accord the lower courts’ views as persuasive interpretive 
inputs when it addresses a question previously addressed by the 
lower courts. For example, if six circuits have held that skate-
boards are “vehicles” within the meaning of a statute barring 
vehicles from federal wildlife refuges, and only one circuit has 
disagreed, how should that division affect the Supreme Court’s 
resolution of that question? That manner of using precedent 
should be distinguished from various other roles that lower-
court precedent plays in Supreme Court decisions. 
We can begin by distinguishing and setting aside those 
situations in which lower-court precedent is relevant because 
the particular doctrines at issue themselves direct the Supreme 
Court to consider the state of the preexisting law. Some exam-
ples will clarify. Consider the doctrine of qualified immunity, 
which applies when government officials are sued for violating 
constitutional rights. In such a case, it is not necessarily deter-
minative that the official violated the law, for qualified immunity 
shields the official from liability unless the illegality was clear at 
the time of the alleged violation.20 The inquiry into the clarity of 
the preexisting law often calls for an examination of not only 
Supreme Court precedent, but also that of the lower courts, for 
the latter may well have been the precedent that most directly 
addressed the particular circumstances that confronted the offi-
cial.21 A related example comes from the habeas context, in 
which the Supreme Court might examine the prevailing law of 
the lower courts to determine whether one of its recent decisions 
constitutes a “new rule” that does not apply retroactively to upset 
old criminal convictions.22 Similarly, the views of lower courts 
are relevant in assessing whether a litigant’s arguments were so 
 
 20 See Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 231–32, 243–44 (2009). 
 21 See, for example, Wilson v Layne, 526 US 603, 617 (1999) (noting the absence of 
“a consensus of [lower-court] cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer 
could not have believed that his actions were lawful”). Likewise, the state of precedent, 
including lower-court precedent, can be directly relevant to determining whether a good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See, for example, Davis v United States, 
131 S Ct 2419, 2428–29 (2011) (holding that exclusion was improper when the search 
complied with then-binding circuit law).  
 22 Chaidez v United States, 133 S Ct 1103, 1111 (2013) (determining that a Supreme 
Court decision was a “new rule” in part because the decision overturned the law of the 
vast majority of jurisdictions). But see id at 1120 (Sotomayor dissenting) (disputing the 
relevance of the lower-court cases). 
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frivolous that the imposition of attorneys’ fees or sanctions is 
warranted.23 
Still another use of lower-court decisions, also not at issue 
here, occurs when lower-court case law on unrelated questions, 
or even from separate fields of law, is cited as evidence of a 
term’s ordinary meaning. That is, if the Supreme Court wants to 
know whether the phrase “filed any complaint” in the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 193824 can include complaints made orally, the 
Court might consider, among other things, whether judicial 
opinions from various fields of law ever refer to oral submissions 
as “filings.”25 In such cases, lower courts are being treated like 
dictionaries in the same way that the Court sometimes uses 
newspapers and other writings in order to discern the ordinary 
meaning of a word or phrase.26 Lower-court decisions used in 
this way are being given a sort of linguistic authority, but the 
lower-court decisions themselves do not address the question 
before the Court and so are not really being invoked as authori-
ties on that question. Similarly irrelevant here are instances in 
which the Supreme Court looks to lower-court decisions predat-
ing some enactment in an effort to understand the legal back-
ground against which Congress legislated.27 In such an instance, 
the lower courts’ decisions are derivatively useful to the extent 
that they can shed light on likely congressional intent or reveal 
the existing fabric of the law into which the new statute has to 
be woven, but they do not and could not directly address the 
question before the Court. 
Finally, the usage of lower-court precedent at issue in this 
Article is distinct from the phenomenon of the Supreme Court 
 
 23 See, for example, Pierce v Underwood, 487 US 552, 555–56, 569 (1988) (discussing 
lower-court decisions in determining whether the government’s litigation position was 
“substantially justified” for purposes of a fee-shifting statute). 
 24 29 USC § 201 et seq. 
 25 Kasten v Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp, 131 S Ct 1325, 1329, 1332 
(2011). See also Moskal v United States, 498 US 103, 121–25 (1990) (Scalia dissenting) 
(relying on lower-court decisions, among other things, to establish the legal meaning of 
the term “falsely made”). 
 26 See, for example, Muscarello v United States, 524 US 125, 126–30 (1998) (citing, 
among other things, dictionaries, the Bible, Robinson Crusoe, Moby-Dick, and computer 
databases of newspaper articles to determine the meaning of the word “carry”). 
 27 See, for example, Kappos v Hyatt, 132 S Ct 1690, 1697–1700 (2012); Setser v 
United States, 132 S Ct 1463, 1468 (2012); Skilling v United States, 130 S Ct 2896, 2930–
31 (2010). The Court’s opinions interpreting 42 USC § 1983 frequently canvass the state 
of the common law when the statute was enacted, which involves considering scads of 
nineteenth-century state-court decisions. See, for example, Filarsky v Delia, 132 S Ct 
1657, 1662–65 (2012). 
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borrowing language from the lower courts for use in its own 
opinions. Research shows that the Court sometimes copies 
material (with or without attribution) from lower-court deci-
sions, especially the particular decision under review.28 Even 
when that kind of borrowing occurs in the Court’s legal analysis 
(as opposed to its recitation of the facts of the case before it), the 
borrowing can happen whether or not the borrowed-from deci-
sion represents the majority of the lower courts (and, moreover, 
the Court can copy language in order to criticize the copied-from 
decision).29 Therefore, that kind of borrowing does not really 
bear on the questions explored here, which involve whether the 
Court does and should adopt particular legal positions because 
most of the lower courts have done so. 
To be clear, the point of setting aside these uses of lower-
court decisions is not to declare them unimportant. The lower 
courts generate much of the law of our land, and their work 
therefore finds its way into the Supreme Court’s opinions for 
countless reasons. The topic explored here is the Supreme 
Court’s use of lower-court precedent as a persuasive authority 
when the Court addresses a question that lower courts have 
previously decided. Now that the inquiry has been focused, this 
Article considers the variety of reasons why lower-court deci-
sions on a question of law might carry weight with the Supreme 
Court. 
II.  ASSESSING POTENTIAL REASONS TO DEFER TO LOWER COURTS 
The Supreme Court has not articulated a theoretical account 
of whether the lower courts’ views matter, when they matter, or 
why they matter. Some scholars have addressed certain aspects of 
these issues, typically focusing on some particular rationale for 
deference to lower courts. Probably the most notable treatment is 
Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey’s study of the 
Supreme Court’s 1993 Term.30 Emphasizing the value of stability 
in the law, the authors criticize the Court for too casually upset-
ting settled law, including law represented by long-standing 
lines of lower-court precedent.31 Stability is indeed an important 
 
 28 See Pamela C. Corley, Paul M. Collins Jr, and Bryan Calvin, Lower Court Influence 
on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J Polit 31, 37–38, 42 (2011). 
 29 See id at 33–34, 42. 
 30 See generally William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as 
Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 26 (1994). 
 31 See id at 76–81.  
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value, but stability is just one of several potential reasons for 
giving weight to the views of the lower courts. In fact, there are 
at least six distinct justifications. Some of them have more intui-
tive appeal than others, and some of them find more support in 
the Court’s opinions than others. Some of the rationales may re-
quire near unanimity in the lower courts, though others may 
have some force even in the case of narrower majorities. 
The six rationales can be loosely grouped into two broad 
categories: those that view lower-court decisions as possessing 
some informational content and those that seek to promote some 
other institutional value. The first group contains the following 
three rationales: 
• Epistemic value. The Supreme Court should pay atten-
tion to the lower courts because the fact that they have 
ruled a certain way tends to show that their favored 
position is actually correct. That is, the views of the 
lower courts can have epistemic, or truth-revealing, 
value. 
• Modest pragmatism. When the lower courts generate a 
certain state of the law, the Supreme Court can then 
observe the consequences. If those consequences appear 
tolerable, then a risk-averse high court might be reluc-
tant to try out an untested rule with unknown effects. 
• Acquiescence. If the lower courts have clearly settled 
on a particular view of the law and Congress has not 
repudiated that view, Congress can be said to have 
implicitly ratified that view. 
Honoring lower-court precedent can also advance at least 
the following three institutional values: 
• Stability. There is value in the law being settled and 
stable. That is true whether the law comes from posi-
tive enactments, Supreme Court decisions, or a consis-
tent line of lower-court authority. 
• Compliance. The Supreme Court might have an easier 
time getting the lower courts to obey its decisions if it 
rules in accord with what most lower courts are al-
ready doing. 
• Constraint. Following the lower courts and ratifying 
their majority view provides an objectively constrain-
ing methodology for the Supreme Court to follow while 
still ensuring that there is nationally uniform and 
authoritative law. 
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The following sections explore each rationale and consider 
whether, when, and why it has force. After that, Part II.G com-
bines the various partial insights to reach some more general 
conclusions. 
A. Epistemic Value 
Chief Justice John Roberts recently wrote, in a dissenting 
opinion that rejected the majority’s appeal to the authority of 
lower-court consensus, that the Supreme Court “do[es] not re-
solve questions . . . by a show of hands.”32 In one sense he is 
wrong, for the Court itself operates by majority rule when the 
justices disagree: five trumps four.33 But in another sense he is 
correct. A court is supposed to be a “forum of principle,”34 a 
domain in which majoritarian might does not make right. 
Nonetheless, one can construct a fairly simple argument to 
the effect that the Supreme Court, when engaged in its own 
search for the correct answer to the question before it, should 
give weight to the views of other decisionmakers. Individual 
wisdom is limited, so heeding the judgment of other actors—at 
least if they are reasonably smart, well-informed, and quite nu-
merous—might guide the Court toward the correct answer. This 
borrowed wisdom could come from any number of sources, in-
cluding foreign courts, expert administrative agencies, legal his-
torians, or popular opinion. Which of those sources are worth 
heeding depends, of course, on the nature of the question and 
one’s theory of judicial decisionmaking. But one especially prom-
ising source of guidance is the lower courts, for they, unlike 
some other sources, broadly resemble the Supreme Court in 
terms of the questions that they confront and the norms that 
govern their decisionmaking. The fact that a large majority of 
judges have converged on a particular answer to some legal 
question provides some reason to believe that their answer is 
indeed correct.35 
 
 32 CSX Transportation, Inc v McBride, 131 S Ct 2630, 2650 (2011) (Roberts dissenting). 
 33 For a valuable meditation on the role of majority rule in multimember courts, see 
generally Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 
Yale L J 1692 (2014).  
 34 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 69–71 (Harvard 1985).  
 35 My discussion of the epistemic argument for following lower-court precedent 
largely adheres to that argument’s internal logic. The epistemic argument confronts 
some significant difficulties even on its own terms. Those skeptical of the possibility of 
legal claims being correct will of course have their own more fundamental doubts. This is 
not the place to review the debate over whether legal propositions can be true, but for 
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More formally, one can support this commonsense intuition 
by invoking the Condorcet Jury Theorem.36 When the members 
of a group are all better than random at selecting the correct an-
swer to a question, the likelihood that a majority vote of the 
group will select the correct answer approaches certainty as the 
size of the group increases.37 Thus, the aggregate decisionmak-
ing ability of a modestly competent large group can outperform 
the judgment of the most expert individuals. The Jury Theorem 
or similar logic has been used as support for the judicial doctrine 
of stare decisis and, more generally, as support for recognizing 
the wisdom of tradition.38 The same logic could be invoked in the 
case of lower-court precedent. If one assumes that lower-court 
judges are better than random in their decisions, then the result 
embraced by the majority of a large group of them is probably 
right, and it would be wise for the Supreme Court to give weight 
to that majority view, even if the justices are individually more 
competent than their “inferiors.” To give a stylized example, if 
lower-court judges are each right 60 percent of the time, and if 
10 out of 15 of them answer some question a particular way, we 
can be almost 90 percent sure that the majority is right.39 
 
helpful points of entry into that debate, see Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth 3–21 (Ox-
ford 1996). See also generally Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in Dennis Patterson, 
ed, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 488 (Blackwell 1999). 
 36 See Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, Condorcet: Selected 
Writings 48–49 (Bobbs-Merrill 1976) (Keith Michael Baker, ed). See also Duncan Black, 
The Theory of Committees and Elections 163 (Kluwer 1987).  
 37 The simplest version of the Jury Theorem involves a choice between two options 
and requires that the members of the group be more than 50 percent likely to choose the 
correct option. The Theorem can be generalized to plurality voting among more than two 
options, though the results are not as powerful. See David M. Estlund, Democratic 
Authority: A Philosophical Framework 226–30 (Princeton 2008); Christian List and Rob-
ert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J Polit 
Phil 277, 283–88 (2001). There is no need to dwell on these sorts of complications, for the 
Jury Theorem suffers from more important limitations even in the simplest case (as this 
Section will explain).  
 38 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds: Why the 
Founding Document Doesn’t Mean What It Meant Before 51–52 (Princeton 2009) (linking 
Condorcet to a Burkean form of judicial minimalism). See also John O. McGinnis and 
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw U L Rev 803, 845 
(2009) (“That a majority of Justices previously interpreted the original meaning of the 
Constitution in one way provides evidence for that interpretation.”). For a criticism of 
epistemic/Condorcetian defenses of precedent, see Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Con-
stitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 Colum L Rev 1482, 1485–1517 (2007). 
 39 For the formula that gives this result, see Black, The Theory of Committees and 
Elections at 164 (cited in note 36). It is not entirely clear how one should measure the 
size of the “jury” that resolves an appeal. In the text above I count each judge separately, 
but that is by no means the only approach. See note 43 (noting the possibility that judges 
on a panel defer to each other).  
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Nonetheless, there are several difficulties with the Condorcet-
inspired argument for deference to lower courts. One obvious 
limitation is that the argument becomes more forceful as the 
size of the majority increases—and so, even on its own terms, 
the argument is weak in narrow splits. That by itself significantly 
limits the domain in which the argument could operate. In order 
to present the Condorcetian argument in its best light, let us 
confine ourselves to the subset of Supreme Court cases that fea-
ture a more lopsided split. Even in those circumstances, the argu-
ment must confront at least the following three difficulties. 
1. Independent decisions. 
For one thing, the Jury Theorem derives its power from 
aggregating the views of many independent individuals.40 As a 
matter of established practice, however, lower courts are sup-
posed to give weight to the views of other lower courts. Uniform-
ity is, for the lower courts, a goal in its own right.41 The mere 
fact that one circuit has answered a question in a particular way 
provides a reason for other circuits to follow suit, a reason that 
becomes stronger as more courts join the trend.42 Thus, a lop-
sided majority in the lower courts might not represent a consen-
sus of experts but could simply demonstrate a powerful band-
wagon effect.43 (In fact, one good argument against a firm rule of 
 
 40 It is not the case that the Jury Theorem is wholly inapplicable when the 
decisionmakers are not independent (in the relevant, technical sense), but the lack of 
independence reduces the effective size of the jury, diminishing the force of any consensus. 
See Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld, Rousseau’s General Will: A Condorcetian Perspec-
tive, 82 Am Polit Sci Rev 567, 571 (1988). See also generally David M. Estlund, Opinion 
Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, 36 Theory & Decision 131 (1994) 
(discussing the meaning of “independence” in the Jury Theorem). 
 41 See Colby v J.C. Penney Co, 811 F2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir 1987):  
Bearing in mind the interest in maintaining a reasonable uniformity of federal 
law and in sparing the Supreme Court the burden of taking cases merely to re-
solve conflicts between circuits, we give most respectful consideration to the 
decisions of the other courts of appeals and follow them whenever we can. 
 42 See David E. Klein, Making Law in the United States Courts of Appeals 88–91 
(Cambridge 2004) (noting the varied reasons that appellate judges report for whether 
and why they consider the judgments of sister circuits). 
 43 See generally Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to 
Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 Am L & Econ Rev 
158 (1999). Making matters worse, individual judges on an appellate panel might defer 
to one another, such that the unanimous decision of a federal court of appeals does not 
actually represent three separate votes. See generally Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, 
and Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 3 J Legal Analysis 101 (2011) (modeling the phenomenon of dissent aversion). 
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intercircuit stare decisis is precisely that it gives too much 
weight to the first-mover court, which could err and then drag 
the others along.44) To the extent that the lower courts defer to 
one another, that diminishes the argument that the Supreme 
Court should in turn defer to their accumulated wisdom, which 
is in fact not so accumulated after all. 
2. Relative competence. 
The Jury Theorem reminds us of the power of sheer numbers: 
a large crowd of people of middling ability can outperform an 
expert few. Nonetheless, the competence of individual decision-
makers still matters. If Supreme Court justices are significantly 
more likely to reach correct results than lower-court judges, then a 
bare majority on the Supreme Court could more reliably reach 
the right result than could a sizable majority of lower-court 
judges. 
There are several reasons to believe that the Supreme Court 
is, in the main, better positioned to reach correct decisions.45 To 
be sure, different theories of judging may disagree about which 
features of an environment best promote sound decisionmaking. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court operates in a resource-rich en-
vironment that most theories would deem helpful. Internally, 
the justices have large and highly competent staffs of law clerks 
and librarians.46 Perhaps more importantly, the Court’s relatively 
small docket provides the luxury of time.47 Turning to external 
resources, Supreme Court advocacy is increasingly the preserve 
 
 44 See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 380–81 (Har-
vard 1999). 
 45 The next few paragraphs draw on material in two prior articles. See Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 Notre 
Dame L Rev 727, 740–41 (2013); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: 
How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L Rev 433, 470–73 (2012).  
 46 See Posner, The Federal Courts at 140–42 (cited in note 44); Bruhl, 89 Notre 
Dame L Rev at 740 (cited in note 45). 
 47 Occasionally, the Court or individual justices have to act on an emergency matter 
with little time for reflection. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court’s ruminative 
advantage is reduced. See Mike Dorf, How to Think about Likelihood of Success on the 
Merits: Further Reflections on the Little Sisters and the Utah SSM Cases, Dorf on Law 
(Jan 6, 2014), online at http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/01/how-to-think-about-likelihood 
-of.html (visited Aug 12, 2014) (suggesting that it might be reasonable for a justice to use 
lower-court views as a proxy for likelihood of success on the merits when under time 
pressure, but that no such deference is appropriate when there is time for deliberation). 
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of highly competent specialists.48 These lawyers, whether in 
private firms, public-interest organizations, or the Solicitor 
General’s office, bring a high degree of effort and skill to each 
case and leave few stones unturned. To the extent that any im-
portant aspects of the case are neglected by the parties, amicus 
briefs fill the gap. Almost every Supreme Court case attracts 
them, often many of them.49 Aside from conventional legal ar-
guments, these briefs can offer useful information on policy con-
text, interest group alignments, preferences of other political ac-
tors, and relevant facts not contained in the formal record.50 
Even when the United States or one of its agencies is not a party 
to the case, the government usually files high-quality amicus cu-
riae briefs that provide a wealth of useful information.51 
The above list of contextual features omits the characteris-
tics of the justices themselves.52 Supreme Court justices come 
from a national talent pool, hold the most elite credentials, and 
are closely scrutinized for the acceptability of their political 
views. All of this differs somewhat for judges on lower federal 
courts and on state courts (though, for the latter, the selection 
processes differ substantially from state to state, making it hard to 
 
 48 See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters before and within the Supreme Court: 
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Georgetown L J 1487, 1497–1502 
(2008). 
 49 See Paul M. Collins Jr, Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial 
Decision Making 47 (Oxford 2008); Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill, The Influ-
ence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U Pa L Rev 743, 751–56 (2000). 
 50 See Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Infor-
mational Role of Amici Curiae, in Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, eds, Supreme 
Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 215, 225–28 (Chicago 1999) 
(explaining that amicus briefs often provide information about the preferences of the 
other governmental branches and the public); Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of 
Science and Law, 280 Science 537, 538 (1998) (stating that amicus briefs can educate the 
Court on technical matters and improve decisionmaking); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adver-
sarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 Duke L J 1, 35–37 (2011) 
(discussing the use of amicus briefs, especially in the Supreme Court, as sources of ex-
trarecord facts). For a recent, skeptical take on the value of the factual information pro-
vided by some amicus briefs, see generally Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus 
Facts, 100 Va L Rev (forthcoming 2014), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2409071 (visited Aug 12, 2014).  
 51 In recent years, the solicitor general has filed amicus briefs in about 75 percent of 
the Supreme Court’s nonconstitutional civil cases in which the government was not already 
a party. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray and Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s 
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 BC L Rev 1323, 1359 & n 79 (2010). 
 52 Another factor not included in the list of the Court’s institutional advantages is 
the possibility that the larger number of justices (always an en banc court of nine) pro-
vides for better deliberation. The modern Court seems not to engage in much collegial 
debate. See William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 254–55 (Knopf 2001). 
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generalize). Whether these personal characteristics make Supreme 
Court justices more competent decisionmakers is contestable. It 
probably makes them better in some ways (for example, under-
standing the preferences of national political elites and possess-
ing academic knowledge of constitutional law) and worse in oth-
ers (for example, empathizing with the experiences of ordinary 
people). Regardless, any differences in the personal ability of 
judges on different courts are probably swamped by much more 
significant disparities in institutional context. 
The decisionmaking environment is, on the whole, less fa-
vorable the lower one goes down the judicial pyramid. As one 
moves down, the caseloads generally grow while the resources 
shrink. The federal courts of appeals adjudicated over thirty-five 
thousand cases on the merits in 2013.53 Although it would be too 
simplistic to contrast that huge figure with the eighty or so cases 
that the Supreme Court decided on the merits in each of the last 
several years—for one thing, the justices (or their clerks) have to 
wade through thousands of petitions for certiorari to find those 
eighty cases54—the staggering contrast is nonetheless broadly 
instructive. Further, the quality of the advocacy is generally 
lower and more uneven in the lower courts.55 Amicus briefs, 
which are ubiquitous in the Supreme Court, are less common in 
federal courts of appeals and state high courts, thus depriving 
those courts of potentially useful information and perspectives.56 
Lower-court decisions are more likely to be eccentric or politically 
 
 53 2013 Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2013 Annual Report of the 
Director table S-3 (Administrative Office of the US Courts 2013), online at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/tables/S03Sep13.pdf 
(visited Aug 12, 2014). 
 54 See 2013 Annual Report at table A-1 (cited in note 15). 
 55 See Posner, The Federal Courts at 142 (cited in note 44) (noting that the Su-
preme Court has the advantage of “better briefs and better-prepared oral arguments”); 
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 13 Scribes J Legal Writing 145, 160 (2010) (assessing briefing 
in the Supreme Court as being “pretty uniformly good” and stating that “[y]ou’ll get very 
good briefs in the circuits on a lesser number of occasions”). 
 56 See Wendy L. Martinek, Amici Curiae in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 34 Am Polit 
Res 803, 806–09 (2006) (discussing amicus activity in courts of appeals versus the Su-
preme Court); Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal 
Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 Rev Litig 669, 686–
87 (2008) (discussing amicus activity in lower federal courts). See also generally Scott A. 
Comparato, Amici Curiae and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts (Praeger 
2003) (discussing amicus participation and its effects in state courts).  
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extreme, given that the decisionmaking units consist of smaller 
numbers of judges.57 
It should be said, in defense of the lower courts, that they do 
have certain advantages over the Supreme Court. For one thing, 
lower-court judges have more experience with some issues than 
the appellate generalists on the Supreme Court. One would ex-
pect that federal bankruptcy judges are more knowledgeable 
about bankruptcy law and policy, for example, and that the aver-
age federal or state trial judge probably understands the conse-
quences of various procedural and evidentiary rules better than 
the justices, most of whom have little or no trial experience.58 
The justices’ opinions occasionally contain hints of deference 
to lower-court expertise. In a securities case a few years ago, the 
Court applied a test that departed from a long line of lower-
court interpretations.59 Justice Stevens wrote separately to ex-
plain that he would have followed that line of cases, a line that 
had begun decades ago in the Second Circuit with opinions by 
Judge Henry Friendly.60 Stevens cited not just the age and num-
ber of lower-court precedents, but also relied on Friendly’s repu-
tation as “[o]ne of our greatest jurists.”61 Stevens seemed to sug-
gest that the Second Circuit, and Friendly in particular, knew 
more about how to shape securities law than the formally 
“supreme” justices.62 (As this example shows, the reputations of 
particular judges and courts matter, not just how many lower 
courts are involved.) One also finds occasional references to the 
expertise of trial judges as a class on matters of litigation proce-
 
 57 See Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 Colum L Rev 1600, 1608, 
1630–33 (2000) (explaining that smaller groups of judges are likely to be less representa-
tive of the whole judiciary than larger groups). 
 58 See Kevin M. Clermont and Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 Iowa L Rev 821, 850–52 (2010) (noting the justices’ apparent confusion on 
basic matters of trial procedure); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-
Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex L Rev 1, 58 (1994) (noting 
that “district courts might be better situated to determine whether particular eviden-
tiary exclusionary rules deter police misconduct, given their greater exposure to testimony 
by and about police officers”). On the current Court, only Justice Sonia Sotomayor has 
experience as a trial judge. White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release, 
Judge Sonia Sotomayor (May 26, 2009), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press 
_office/Background-on-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor (visited Aug 12, 2009).  
 59 See Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 130 S Ct 2869, 2878–81 (2010) 
(Scalia). 
 60 Id at 2889 (Stevens concurring in the judgment). 
 61 Id at 2889–90 (Stevens concurring in the judgment). 
 62 See id at 2889 (Stevens concurring in the judgment) (calling the majority opinion 
“misplaced” in light of the history of Second Circuit jurisprudence on the topic). 
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dure.63 Invocations of the lower courts’ wisdom sometimes occur 
in dissents rather than majority opinions, but Eric Hansford 
found tentative support for the proposition that circuits with 
greater experience in certain subject areas are affirmed more often 
in those areas than non-expert circuits, though he deemed the 
effect more likely attributable to the experienced circuits being 
able to make better decisions than to the Supreme Court granting 
those circuits any particular deference.64 
For justices who regard legislative intent as an important 
source of guidance, the lower courts might also hold an advan-
tage, at least in theory, because the lower courts sometimes de-
cide their cases at around the time of the original enactment, 
with the Supreme Court following later. In another securities 
case, the Supreme Court also overturned a long line of lower-
court precedent, but Justice Stevens would have followed those 
cases because, among other things, the lower-court judges were 
“closer to the times and climate of the [enacting] Congress.”65 Of 
course, any advantage derived from being an early decisionmaker 
has to be balanced against the inherent advantages of coming 
later. As a particular question is litigated and decided repeatedly, 
later courts can study the reasoning of those that came before, 
dig more deeply into the relevant material, and perhaps discern 
the consequences of the prior decisions. 
The last few paragraphs have suggested that lower courts, 
even individually, might possess certain advantages over the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court should hesitate, for example, 
before upsetting a lower-court consensus on a matter of trial proce-
 
 63 See, for example, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States, 491 US 617, 635 
(1989) (Blackmun dissenting) (stating that the Court “should heed the warnings of our 
District Court judges, whose day-to-day exposure to the criminal-trial process enables 
them to understand, perhaps far better than we, the devastating consequences of [the 
Court’s approach]”). Another area in which lower-court judges likely enjoy an advantage 
over the Supreme Court is familiarity with state law. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Resusci-
tating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’ Interpretations of State Law, 77 S Cal L 
Rev 975, 1022–26 (2004). However, questions of state law would rarely be the topic of a 
split of authority warranting the Supreme Court’s intervention. 
 64 See Eric Hansford, Note, Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit 
Split Resolutions, 63 Stan L Rev 1145, 1146, 1155–56, 1167 (2011). 
 65 Central Bank of Denver, NA v First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA, 511 US 164, 
192–93 (1994) (Stevens dissenting). Similarly, constitutional originalists might give ex-
tra weight to the views and practices of early government officials, many of whom were 
involved in the framing and ratification of the Constitution. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fore-
word: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv L Rev 26, 81 (2000) (suggesting that a 
judge might think that “[i]f John Marshall and his brethren thought X, perhaps X is 
right after all, despite initial appearances to the contrary”).  
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dure about which the Court’s knowledge is remote and academic. 
Nonetheless, in the run of cases, the Supreme Court operates in 
circumstances that make it more capable than the lower courts 
taken individually. The point of the Jury Theorem, of course, is 
to consider the lower courts as a numerous group, but if the 
Court’s competence advantage is large, it would take quite a 
sizable lower-court majority for their collective view to carry 
serious epistemic weight. 
3. Different questions. 
A less obvious but perhaps more fundamental problem with 
the Condorcet-inspired argument for deferring to lower-court 
views is that, in some cases, the Supreme Court is not even an-
swering the same question that the lower courts addressed. This 
is so for a few reasons. For one, the question in any case is not 
just the proper interpretation of some statute or constitutional 
provision on a blank slate, but rather the proper interpretation 
given the constraints of precedent. Those constraints differ 
markedly as one moves up the judicial hierarchy. The Supreme 
Court’s holdings are absolutely binding on the lower courts but 
only somewhat binding on the Court itself.66 A lower court might 
face a question that finds an easy answer in existing Supreme 
Court precedent, but in the Supreme Court the question could be 
whether that precedent should be overruled, a question that the 
lower courts could not entertain. Consider in that regard the 
Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v United States,67 which evalu-
ated whether the Sixth Amendment permits judges, rather than 
juries, to find facts that increase a defendant’s minimum sen-
tence.68 A prior Supreme Court case, Harris v United States,69 
had permitted the practice.70 The lower court in Alleyne, like other 
lower courts in countless decisions before it, had relied on Harris 
and curtly rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge.71 Yet 
 
 66 See Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American Express, Inc, 490 US 477, 484 
(1989) (explaining that “the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly con-
trols, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”). 
 67 133 S Ct 2151 (2013). 
 68 Id at 2155. 
 69 536 US 545 (2002). 
 70 Id at 568. 
 71 See United States v Alleyne, 457 Fed Appx 348, 350 (4th Cir 2011) (stating that 
“Supreme Court precedent forecloses” the defendant’s argument). See also, for example, 
United States v Brown, 653 F3d 656, 659–60 (8th Cir 2011) (refusing to depart from the 
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the Supreme Court overruled Harris in Alleyne.72 The lower 
court was reversed even though it had decided “correctly.” The 
Supreme Court was just asking a different question. 
A related problem concerns Supreme Court dicta. Lower 
courts are strongly influenced by the Supreme Court’s dicta,73 
but the Supreme Court itself treats dicta more casually. For a 
revealing example, consider whether the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 196774 (ADEA) recognizes a disparate-impact 
theory of liability. Lower courts that addressed the question in 
the statute’s early years overwhelmingly held that it did recog-
nize such a theory.75 Then, in 1993, the Supreme Court’s Hazen 
Paper Co v Biggins76 opinion stated that “[d]isparate treat-
ment”—not disparate impact—“captures the essence of what 
Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA.”77 This statement 
would be considered dicta under any of the traditional defini-
tions; indeed, the statement openly announced itself as such.78 
And yet, after Hazen Paper, most circuits that addressed the 
question as a matter of first impression held that the ADEA did 
not recognize a disparate-impact theory—and some courts that 
had previously accepted the theory reversed course.79 The Supreme 
Court finally answered the question in 2005 and held, contrary 
to the newly emerging countertrend triggered by its own dicta, 
 
rule in Harris since “only the Supreme Court may overrule its controlling decisions”), 
cert denied, 132 S Ct 1649 (2012). 
 72 Alleyne, 133 S Ct at 2163. 
 73 See, for example, Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc v Chrysler Motors Corp, 959 
F2d 468, 495 n 41 (3d Cir 1992) (“Generally, [ ] we consider and respect Supreme Court 
dicta as well as holdings because the Supreme Court hears relatively few cases and fre-
quently uses dicta to give guidance to the lower courts.”). See also David Klein and Neal 
Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory versus Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 Wm 
& Mary L Rev 2021, 2025–26, 2032–42 (2013) (providing empirical evidence that the 
holding/dictum distinction rarely affects lower-court decisionmaking); Frederick Schauer, 
Opinions as Rules, 53 U Chi L Rev 682, 683–84 (1986) (“In interpretive arenas below the 
Supreme Court, one good quote [from the Supreme Court] is worth a hundred clever 
analyses of the holding.”).  
 74 29 USC § 621 et seq. 
 75 See Smith v City of Jackson, Mississippi, 544 US 228, 236–37 (2005) (collecting 
cases illustrating the history of the statute’s interpretation in lower courts). 
 76 507 US 604 (1993). 
 77 Id at 610 (emphasis added). 
 78 See id (“[W]e have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is 
available under the ADEA, and we need not do so here.”) (citation omitted). 
 79 See Smith, 544 US at 236–37. See also Smith v City of Jackson, Mississippi, 351 
F3d 183, 195 n 14 (5th Cir 2003) (citing Hazen Paper for support while recognizing that 
it was not binding), affd 544 US 228 (2005); Mullin v Raytheon Co, 164 F3d 696, 700–01 
(1st Cir 1999) (noting that “[t]he tectonic plates shifted” after Hazen Paper and that 
courts started to reject the disparate-impact theory). 
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that there was indeed a disparate-impact theory after all!80 The 
seemingly portentous remark in Hazen Paper was dismissed as 
irrelevant commentary.81 There are plenty of similar examples 
in which lower courts followed dicta and then had the rug pulled 
out from under them later.82 More broadly, if lower courts are 
using dicta to try to predict what the Supreme Court will do 
rather than trying to independently engage with the authorita-
tive legal materials,83 then a consensus of the lower courts is not 
very edifying to the Supreme Court. 
Questions may also look different at different points in the 
judicial hierarchy because the Supreme Court’s grant of certio-
rari can—in a sort of legal version of Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle—itself shift the legal background so that the right an-
swer to the question actually changes after the Supreme Court 
decides to hear the case. For instance, a grant of certiorari occa-
sionally induces the federal government to announce a new ad-
ministrative interpretation of a statute. Such interpretations, 
even when presented in formats such as an amicus brief by the 
solicitor general, receive a degree of weight.84 The question for 
the Supreme Court then becomes how best to interpret the statute 
given the semiauthoritative gloss supplied by the executive 
 
 80 See Smith, 544 US at 240. The theory that the Court adopted was a rather nar-
row one as compared to the version of disparate impact that is available under Title VII. 
See id. 
 81 See id at 237–38.  
 82 See generally, for example, Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc v West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 US 598 (2001). Justice Antonin Scalia 
referred to the dissent’s call to honor the lower-court consensus on the question presented 
as “particularly peculiar in the present case, since that [lower-court] majority has been nur-
tured and preserved by our own misleading dicta.” Id at 621 (Scalia concurring).  
 83 The usual view is that the lower courts are supposed to decide matters independ-
ently, but some features of the legal system openly embrace prediction, which probably oc-
curs covertly even more frequently. See Caminker, 73 Tex L Rev at 8–22 (cited in note 58).  
 84 See, for example, Talk America, Inc v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 131 S Ct 
2254, 2257 n 1, 2260–61, 2263–64 (2011) (deferring to the FCC’s view, as put forth in the 
government’s amicus brief, and reversing the judgment). See also William N. Eskridge Jr 
and Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Georgetown L J 1083, 1112, 1143 
(2008) (noting instances of deference to agency inputs and observing that the “Court of-
ten requests that the Solicitor General submit an amicus brief”); Michael E. Solimine, 
The Solicitor General Unbound: Amicus Curiae Activism and Deference in the Supreme 
Court, 45 Ariz St L J 1183, 1212–14 (2013) (describing the influence that amicus briefs 
filed by the solicitor general enjoy, and questioning the optimal level of deference); Kath-
ryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw U L Rev 997, 
1034–47 (2007) (explaining that the Court has increasingly invited agency views, and 
arguing that courts should be required to give due consideration to agency amicus 
briefs). 
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authorities who administer the statute. In such a case, the deci-
sions of the lower courts are not very relevant, because they 
originated within an interpretive universe that has now expanded. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court and the lower courts could both 
be right even if they reach opposite conclusions. 
More fundamentally, it could be that the lower courts and 
the Supreme Court—while all engaged in nominally the same 
judicial activity—are actually engaged in quite different enter-
prises with different aims. For example, it might make sense for 
the Supreme Court to regard itself as participating in a dialogue 
with Congress and the executive branch, such that the Court’s 
role is not to answer questions correctly and finally in the first 
instance, but rather to spur other institutions of government into 
action so that the system as a whole comes to a proper resolu-
tion of the matter.85 For lower courts, whose decisions are less 
salient, such dynamics are more remote.86 As another possibility, 
the Court’s rulings may need to take on a different, more mana-
gerial cast given its hierarchical position.87 More radically, one 
might view the Court’s role, in certain kinds of cases, as that of a 
tribunal of philosopher-kings who should decide the great ques-
tions before them on (possibly evolving) moral and prudential 
grounds,88 quite unlike the lower courts, whose dominant role is 
just to apply the rules laid down, umpire-like, to the discrete 
disputes before them. 
* * * 
Considering all of these limitations, how powerful is the 
epistemic argument? The fact that lower courts give weight to 
 
 85 See Bruhl, 97 Cornell L Rev at 459–62 (cited in note 45) (discussing democracy-
forcing and preference-eliciting approaches to judicial interpretation); Richard L. Hasen, 
End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S Cal L 
Rev 205, 210–13 (2013) (discussing interpretive doctrines premised on dialogue between 
the courts and Congress). Dialogic approaches are easiest to appreciate in statutory mat-
ters, but such approaches can also apply in the constitutional sphere. See, for example, 
Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 25–36 
(Harvard 1999) (arguing that judicial minimalism in constitutional decisionmaking can 
trigger beneficial democratic deliberation). 
 86 See text accompanying notes 102–04. 
 87 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 Cornell 
L Rev 1, 4, 59 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court should issue broad, clarifying rul-
ings to provide guidance to the lower courts). 
 88 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv L 
Rev 31, 81–84 (2005) (describing the notion—which Judge Richard Posner associates 
with Professor Alexander Bickel, among others—that the Supreme Court serves as the 
nation’s “moral vanguard”). 
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other lower courts’ views means that even a large consensus might 
not represent as much wisdom as it seems. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court operates in a more favorable environment in which to “find” 
the law, further counteracting the lower courts’ numerical advan-
tage. And in some cases, the lower courts and the Supreme Court 
are not even addressing the same question. Taken together, all of 
this significantly restricts the range of cases over which the 
epistemic argument could operate, though it does not render the 
argument totally impotent. 
The uncertainties and contingencies involved in determin-
ing when to credit the epistemic argument create a further com-
plication—namely, that the Supreme Court might not be able to 
reliably determine when the preconditions for the epistemic ar-
gument are satisfied.89 At a certain point, it makes more sense 
just to make an independent decision rather than to struggle 
over whether and how much to defer. 
B. Modest Pragmatism 
A second reason for the Supreme Court to attend to lower-
court precedent derives from a pragmatic concern about the con-
sequences of different possible interpretations of the law. When 
a certain view of the law has been established within a jurisdic-
tion for some time, one can see how things have played out. The 
lower courts, on this account, would act as laboratories conducting 
a decentralized experiment. The Supreme Court could observe 
the results and then, when the time comes, create national law 
in a more practically informed way. The possibility of this sort of 
experimentation and learning would provide one justification for 
the Court’s practice of letting lower-court conflicts percolate for 
a while before stepping in to resolve them.90 
 
 89 For a similar point in the context of judicial application of the Jury Theorem to 
public opinion, see Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They? A Response to If People Would 
Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 Stan L Rev 213, 225 (2007). 
 90 See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv L 
Rev 4, 65 (1998) (noting “the possibility that the passage of time during which there is a 
circuit split creates a record of the consequences of different legal regimes”). See also 
Tom S. Clark and Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in the 
Lower Courts: An Optimal Stopping Model, 75 J Polit 150, 153 (2013) (providing a quan-
titative approach to the question of when the Supreme Court is likely to step in to re-
solve a circuit split); Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court 
Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 Am U L Rev 457, 481–89 (2012) (describing 
various systemic benefits of allowing issues to percolate in the lower courts).  
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The pragmatic argument comes in a few forms, some more 
convincing than others. An ambitious version would have the 
Supreme Court assess the results of the decentralized experi-
ment and then choose the best interpretation as national law. 
Yet one wonders whether the Court could reliably discern which 
of several competing interpretations is generating better conse-
quences. Additionally, the fact that the lower courts are divided 
and the law uncertain might dampen the extent to which conse-
quences manifest themselves.91 
More modest forms of the pragmatic argument are more 
plausible. For instance, suppose that most lower courts have 
embraced a particular position for years, such that their rule has 
been applied many times in many distinct factual contexts. If no 
terrible consequences seem evident, one could conclude that the 
prevailing view is at least workable, even if one could not confi-
dently declare it better than any alternative. An untested view 
would be riskier precisely because one could not be confident 
that it would not cause serious problems. 
An illustration of this form of modest pragmatism comes 
from Tinklenberg, the Speedy Trial Act case discussed earlier.92 
The Sixth Circuit had departed from the long-standing, widely 
embraced view of the statute’s meaning.93 Justice Stephen Breyer’s 
opinion for the Court listed a number of questions about how 
courts could administer the Sixth Circuit’s novel rule.94 While al-
lowing that courts could eventually find ways to overcome the 
“administrative difficulties” that the Sixth Circuit’s approach 
would generate, Breyer preferred the amply tested path that 
other lower courts had already trod: “[A]ny such future strate-
gies for administering the Sixth Circuit’s rule cannot provide a 
present justification for turning the federal judicial system away 
from the far less obstacle-strewn path that the system has long 
traveled.”95 This type of reasoning might be attractive to conse-
quentialist judges who are risk averse or who doubt their own 
ability to accurately predict consequences. It is a satisficing 
strategy (that is, it accepts “good enough,” rather than optimal, 
 
 91 See Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 133 S Ct 1351, 1366 (2013) (noting that 
the expected bad consequences of the competing interpretation adopted by some lower 
courts had not appeared because the law had not been settled for long). 
 92 See text accompanying notes 3–7. 
 93 See Tinklenberg, 131 S Ct at 2014. 
 94 See id at 2014–15. 
 95 Id at 2015 (emphasis added). 
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results)96 and also a form of status quo bias. One could also give 
the argument an evolutionary or Burkean spin: if a certain view 
has persisted over time in some or all jurisdictions, then it 
probably represents some degree of good sense and practical ad-
aptation.97 
The kinds of consequences revealed by lower-court decisions 
need not be limited to matters of judicial administrability such 
as those involved in Tinklenberg. More broadly, the consequences 
could include the public’s reactions to lower-court decisions on 
contentious social matters such as same-sex marriage. In this 
way, lower courts could act as a sort of “backlash” warning system. 
It bears noting that the logic of modest pragmatism is flexible 
enough that it could be invoked even in support of a minority 
view, as long as the minority represents enough of a critical 
mass and enough time has passed that one could detect any ter-
rible consequences that would result from the view. The absence 
of such consequences could then neutralize arguments that the 
view at issue would lead to bad results if the Supreme Court 
adopted it. In fact, the Supreme Court’s invocation of modest 
pragmatism is by no means limited to situations in which it fol-
lows the majority of the lower courts.98 
C. Acquiescence 
Another type of argument also relies on the fact that lower-
court decisions can convey or generate useful information for the 
Supreme Court. In particular, there can sometimes be meaning 
in silence. If Congress does not respond to an authoritative pro-
nouncement about the meaning of a federal statute, one might 
be inclined to take that silence as expressing a degree of con-
gressional approval or at least acquiescence.99 The clearest cases 
involve prior interpretations issued by the Supreme Court or a 
 
 96 See Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making 
Processes in Administrative Organizations 118–20 (Free Press 4th ed 1997) (distinguishing 
between maximizing and satisficing behavior). 
 97 Even Bentham, who otherwise mocks the notion of deferring to prior generations 
(which necessarily lack our experience), explains that past practices are useful guides for 
consequentialists. See Jeremy Bentham, Bentham’s Handbook of Political Fallacies 43–
45, 49–51 (Johns Hopkins 1952) (Harold A. Larrabee, ed). 
 98 See Part III.B.2. 
 99 See generally William N. Eskridge Jr, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich 
L Rev 67 (1988). The acquiescence argument differs from the situation in which the 
Supreme Court uses lower-court decisions (along with other sources) to reconstruct the 
legal background against which Congress legislated. See Part I.B. The acquiescence 
argument concerns events that take place after enactment rather than before. 
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federal administrative agency.100 Yet, in principle, the same ar-
gument applies to lower-court interpretations, at least when 
they are numerous and reasonably long-standing such that they 
represent, practically speaking, the law of the land. 
Arguments based on congressional acquiescence are a bit 
risky even under the best of circumstances. Inaction might re-
flect agreement on the part of successive Congresses, but it 
could just as easily reflect the press of more important matters, 
conflicting preferences about how to amend the statute, the ab-
sence of a majority large and powerful enough to overcome legis-
lative inertia, and so forth.101 When the relevant precedents 
come from the lower courts rather than from the Supreme 
Court, the problems multiply. Congress is less familiar with the 
decisional outputs of the courts of appeals, which is hardly sur-
prising given that the lower courts decide many times more cases 
and those decisions are, almost necessarily, less definitive.102 
Even when Congress does become aware, that same lack of 
(relative) importance and finality makes it less likely that a fail-
ure to respond reflects genuine endorsement.103 This is not to 
deny that Congress does become aware of, and sometimes re-
 
 100 See, for example, Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574, 599–602 
(1983) (“Failure of Congress to modify the IRS rulings . . . make[s] out an unusually 
strong case of legislative . . . ratification by implication.”); Flood v Kuhn, 407 US 258, 
279–83 (1972) (noting several Supreme Court cases granting an antitrust exemption to 
professional baseball and concluding from Congress’s silence that it “had no intention” to 
overrule the Court). 
 101 See Eskridge, 87 Mich L Rev at 98–108 (cited in note 99). The hurdles to amend-
ing the Constitution, as opposed to a statute, are generally even greater, such that im-
puting congressional acquiescence in an interpretation is less justified in the former con-
text than in the latter. 
 102 See Robert A. Katzmann, Courts and Congress 73–74 (Brookings 1997) (finding 
that congressional staffers are generally unaware of statutory interpretation decisions in 
lower courts unless an interest group had lobbied them for relief); William N. Eskridge 
Jr, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L J 331, 337 n 
12, 415–16 (1991) (concluding that Congress is unaware of most lower-court decisions 
and overrides them at a much lower rate than Supreme Court decisions); Stefanie A. 
Lindquist and David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal Circuit Court Deci-
sions, 85 Judicature 61, 68 (2001) (finding that Congress responds to a small percentage 
of circuit court decisions). Congress does not have to read through all of the decisions, of 
course; it can rely on interest groups to bring the few important decisions to its atten-
tion. See, for example, Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am J Polit Sci 165, 165–67 
(1984) (developing the police-patrol and fire-alarm models of congressional oversight of 
the federal bureaucracy). But interest groups, just like Congress, should devote relatively 
less effort to monitoring and demanding corrective action of the lower courts than the 
Supreme Court. 
 103 See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of 
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 Mich L Rev 1, 82–86 (1994). 
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spond to, lower-court precedents.104 The soundness of an infer-
ence of acquiescence is always a matter of degree. But lower-
court interpretations that can realistically claim a congres-
sional blessing—through some combination of salience, near 
uniformity, and duration—should be rare among the sample of 
cases that make their way onto the Supreme Court’s docket.105 
Thus, although a complete accounting awaits Part II.G, it does 
not appear that acquiescence arguments centered on lower-court 
interpretations should play a major role in Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking. 
To be sure, it may be that one should understand acquies-
cence and other inaction-based arguments not as making factual 
claims about actual congressional approval, but instead as making 
a normatively inflected claim about the proper allocation of in-
stitutional functions in a democracy. That is, if a certain inter-
pretation of the law has taken hold (through the work of what-
ever interpreting entity), the interpretation becomes engrafted 
into the statute itself, such that the Supreme Court should treat 
that interpretation as final unless Congress, which has constitu-
tional primacy in statutory matters, displaces it.106 Buttressing 
that democratic argument, one could add that the interpretation 
should be allowed to stand since continuity and stability are in-
stitutional virtues, in large part because settled interpretations 
engender private and public reliance.107 This is therefore an ap-
propriate time to consider stability-based arguments more di-
rectly and to evaluate their force. 
 
 104 See Lindquist and Yalof, 85 Judicature at 63–68 (cited in note 102) (documenting 
instances in which Congress responded to lower-court decisions). 
 105 For much the same reasons that congressional acquiescence usually provides little 
reason for the Supreme Court to honor lower-court precedent, it has been argued that 
lower courts should give their own statutory precedents less stare decisis effect. See Amy 
Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo Wash L Rev 317, 
327–51 (2005). 
 106 See Shearson/American Express Inc v McMahon, 482 US 220, 268 (1987) (Stevens 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]fter a statute has been construed, either 
by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it 
acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the 
Congress itself.”); Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute 
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich L Rev 177, 208–15 (1989) (arguing that, once a 
statute has been interpreted by a reviewing court, further revisions are “basically legis-
lative” because they are not strictly necessary to fill gaps in the text). 
 107 See Eskridge, 87 Mich L Rev at 110–11 (cited in note 99). 
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D. Stability 
Even if lower-court precedent did not convey any useful in-
formation to the Supreme Court, the very fact of its existence 
might generate institutional reasons to honor it. One such po-
tential reason is stability. Stability is a primary rule-of-law value108 
and it forms a large part of the justification for following prece-
dent.109 Stability is valuable for a number of reasons. It promotes 
the equal treatment of similar litigants over time and, perhaps 
most importantly, protects the interests of those who have or-
dered their affairs in reliance on a certain state of the law. Reli-
ance is thus regarded as a critical consideration when a court is 
deciding whether to overturn one of its own precedents instead 
of following the norm of stare decisis.110 
Although the most powerfully reliance-inducing federal 
precedents come from the Supreme Court itself, a proper con-
cern for the value of stability would require one to attend to any 
settled law, regardless of its source.111 In their theory of law as 
equilibrium, Professors Eskridge and Frickey include lower-
court consensus as one of the various sources that, especially 
when combined with agency support and congressional acquies-
cence, can constitute a stable equilibrium worthy of the name 
“law.”112 Eskridge and Frickey accordingly criticize the Supreme 
Court for too lightly upsetting some interpretations that had 
long prevailed in the lower courts.113 More recently, Professor 
Hillel Levin has similarly explained that a reliance-focused ap-
proach to precedent should put some lower-court precedents on 
 
 108 See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 79–81 (Yale rev ed 1969) (describing con-
stancy through time as an aspect of law’s internal morality); Federalist 62 (Madison), in 
The Federalist 415, 420–22 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) (arguing that frequent 
changes in the law produce instability, make the law difficult to follow, and defeat the 
point of self-governance).  
 109 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan L Rev 571, 597–98, 601–02 (1987) 
(describing the benefits of following precedent, including predictability and stability). 
 110 See, for example, Alleyne, 133 S Ct at 2164 (Sotomayor concurring); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 855–56 (1992). See also 
generally Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 Emory L J 1459 (2013) (discussing 
the role of reliance in the doctrine of stare decisis). 
 111 See, for example, Anita S. Krishnakumar, Long-standing Agency Interpretations, 
83 Fordham L Rev *36–38 (forthcoming 2015), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224066 (visited Aug 12, 2014) (arguing that courts should afford 
extra deference to particularly long-standing agency interpretations, in part for reasons 
of reliance and stability). 
 112 See Eskridge and Frickey, 108 Harv L Rev at 76–81 (cited in note 31). 
 113 See id at 80–81. 
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or near the same level as Supreme Court precedents for stare 
decisis purposes.114 
Without denying that stability can provide a reason for the 
Supreme Court to consider the views of lower courts, the stabil-
ity argument has its limits. To begin with, the potential for dis-
ruption and unfairness is worst when all or virtually all of the 
lower courts have been doing things the same way for a long 
time. Yet legal questions that have generated a long-standing 
consensus in the lower courts are, given the Court’s certiorari 
priorities, unlikely to be reviewed. The clearest cases for adhering 
to lower-court precedent are thus uncommon at the merits stage. 
How does the stability rationale fare in the more common 
scenario of division among the lower courts? If the lower courts 
are closely divided, stability probably would not have much of a 
role to play once the Court has decided to grant certiorari, as 
there will be some disruption either way. However, if the lower 
courts are divided in a lopsided fashion, then stability could carry 
some weight. True, the mere existence of a division of authority 
and the lack of a Supreme Court decision probably somewhat 
reduce the extent to which people would regard the law as firmly 
settled and rely on it.115 Nonetheless, strictly from the stability 
perspective, going with the majority view seems less disruptive 
in that fewer affected persons would have to change their con-
duct, learn new law, or have their expectations upset. A further 
wrinkle, however, is that the circuits differ in terms of popula-
tion. The Ninth Circuit contains about 20 percent of the coun-
try’s population. A “minority” view held by the Ninth Circuit 
governs more of the country’s population than a “majority” view 
held by less populous circuits like the First, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits, which contain fewer people combined than the Ninth 
Circuit alone.116 Yet, strangely, it does not appear that the 
 
 114 See Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 Ga L Rev 1035, 1074–
78 (2013); Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 2012 U Ill L Rev 1103, 1141–42. 
 115 It is actually quite hard to know how circuit conflicts affect the regulated public’s 
understanding of what the governing law is and how to order their affairs. For an 
attempt to gauge this through surveys and interviews of lawyers, see Arthur D. Hellman, 
Light on a Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience, 
1998 S Ct Rev 247, 266–99. Further complicating matters, the extent of reliance may 
depend on the Supreme Court’s practices: if it disregards even long-standing and nearly 
unanimous lower-court precedent, people should not rely on such precedents very much, 
which then further justifies the Court’s disregard of them. 
 116 See US Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, online at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (visited Aug 12, 2014). If one wanted to be 
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Supreme Court shows special solicitude to the views of the 
Ninth Circuit. Perhaps the Court is wrong in this respect. 
Another complication with stability arguments is that the 
value of preserving some stable, settled view depends on the 
question at issue. True, any change in the law involves some 
transition costs, such as the burden of learning the new law, up-
dating legal materials, and so forth.117 But some kinds of changes 
are much more disruptive than others. A decision upsetting 
common and entrenched business practices—such as a decision 
extending the antitrust laws to previously unregulated con-
duct,118 or a decision changing the tax treatment of capital in-
vestments—could seriously interfere with citizens’ primary con-
duct and destroy the value of certain assets and expectations, 
especially given that judicial decisions are typically applied retro-
actively. 
Other categories of legal questions are unlikely to involve 
serious reliance problems, even when the lower courts have been 
consistent. The Court’s stare decisis jurisprudence proceeds on 
the premise that evidentiary and procedural rulings, unlike 
those bearing on property and contract rights, are unlikely to 
involve serious reliance costs.119 In the main, that seems right, 
and so there will usually not be serious reliance-related reasons 
to honor the views of lower courts in such matters.120 Even apart 
from that, the damage to reliance interests might depend on the 
direction of the legal change; particularly worrisome are scenarios 
involving decisions that expand the scope of liability. 
Taking all of these considerations together, stability will 
rarely provide a strong reason for the Supreme Court to attend 
 
even more precise, one could consider not total population, but instead the size of the 
affected subset of the population. For example, upsetting the Tenth Circuit’s position on 
a question of federal Indian law could be more disruptive than upsetting the law of a 
more populous circuit that contains fewer tribes. 
 117 See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L 
Rev 789 (2002) (cataloguing various types of legal transition costs). 
 118 See, for example, Toolson v New York Yankees, Inc, 346 US 356, 357 (1953) 
(maintaining the antitrust exemption for baseball because overruling it would upset dec-
ades of development undertaken in reliance on the exemption). 
 119 See, for example, Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in 
favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, 
where reliance interests are involved; the opposite is true in cases . . . involving proce-
dural and evidentiary rules.”) (citations omitted). 
 120 It is not universally the case that procedural and evidentiary changes do not in-
volve serious reliance interests. See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 
67 Wash & Lee L Rev 411, 447 (2010) (providing the example of the law of attorney-
client privilege). 
01 BRUHL_ART_SOFTA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/5/14 11:21 AM 
882  The University of Chicago Law Review [81:851 
   
to the lower courts. The scenarios in which the argument is 
strongest—when the lower courts have overwhelmingly em-
braced a particular view for a long time—are also the scenarios 
in which the Court is least likely to grant review. When the 
Court does take such a case, the argument for attending to a 
lower-court consensus is often strong, particularly when reversal 
would risk serious damage to reliance interests. But in other 
cases the Court should feel little hesitation about upsetting even 
what was very settled law. In Padilla v Kentucky,121 for example, 
the Supreme Court overturned the virtually unanimous view of 
the state and lower federal courts by holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to 
advice about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty.122 
Yet this break with precedent did not hold much disruptive po-
tential. For one thing, prevailing professional norms already 
required such advice even though the Constitution did not.123 
For another, various practical and procedural obstacles would 
likely prevent large numbers of old convictions from being 
overturned.124 
E. Compliance 
Although not a prominent part of the official doctrine, another 
group of potential institutional reasons for the Supreme Court to 
follow lower-court precedent involves compliance. If the Court 
rules in accord with what most of the lower courts are already 
doing, it can be fairly confident that they will keep doing as they 
have done. Further, if enough lower courts have decided a 
question, the majority of that sample should reflect the latent 
majority inclination of the others.125 
 
 121 130 S Ct 1473 (2010). 
 122 Id at 1481–82 & n 9, 1487 (Alito concurring in the judgment) (noting that the 
decision was contrary to “the long-standing and unanimous position of the federal 
courts”). 
 123 See id at 1482, 1485; Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers, et al, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Padilla v Kentucky, Docket No 08-
651, *9–21 (US filed June 2, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 1567356).  
 124 See Padilla, 130 S Ct at 1485–86. See also Chaidez v United States, 133 S Ct 
1103, 1107–11 (2013) (holding that Padilla did not apply retroactively). 
 125 See Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 
31 J Legal Stud 327, 332–33 (2002) (discussing the “polling model” of the Jury Theorem). 
The compliance-centric argument in the text is not making a utilitarian point that the 
Court can satisfy the most preferences by agreeing with the lower-court majority. One 
could make such an argument, but it is unclear why satisfying lower-court preferences 
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A concern about judicial compliance might seem strange or 
even perverse, given that the Supreme Court sits at the top of 
the hierarchy and has the power to reverse. (By contrast, wor-
ries about resistance by nonjudicial actors are more familiar.126) 
But the power relationship between the Supreme Court and 
lower courts is a bit more complicated than that. The lower judi-
ciary is large, and its output is immense compared to the Supreme 
Court’s limited capacity to supervise. If the lower courts decided 
to engage in serious, widespread, and sustained defiance, the 
Supreme Court would not have enough writs of mandamus to 
keep them in line. More than that, the Supreme Court affirma-
tively needs the lower courts to implement, enforce, and flesh 
out the relatively few rulings that it does issue so as to make 
them the actual law of the land.127 The need to ensure some de-
gree of lower-court buy-in provides a reason for the Supreme 
Court to go along with what the lower courts already want. 
Why would lower courts fail to comply with new Supreme 
Court precedents? Like many organizations, courts are conser-
vative and inertial; indeed, courts in particular are supposed to 
be institutionally conservative (in the sense of favoring continu-
ity over change).128 Thus, they sometimes read Supreme Court 
decisions so as to unsettle as little existing law as possible.129 
Beyond that sort of inertial resistance, there could be some topics 
about which feelings on the substantive merits run high enough 
that purposeful resistance is a real prospect.130 One thinks of 
hot-button social issues like school prayer, desegregation and 
 
(whatever that means) would be especially valuable (as compared to aiming to maximize 
overall social welfare). 
 126 See, for example, Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 349 US 294, 301 (1955) 
(ordering that desegregation proceed not immediately, but “with all deliberate speed”). 
See also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L J 585, 609–14 (1983) (explaining 
that the Court chose the “all deliberate speed” formulation in order to reduce anticipated 
resistance by states, school districts, and segregationists). 
 127 See Patricia M. Wald, Upstairs/Downstairs at the Supreme Court: Implications 
of the 1991 Term for the Constitutional Work of the Lower Courts, 61 U Cin L Rev 771, 
778, 799 (1993). 
 128 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 
NYU L Rev 921, 925 (1992). 
 129 See, for example, Brannon P. Denning and Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Re-
sistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 Ark 
L Rev 1253, 1253–57, 1299–1310 (2003) (charting the tepid response of the lower courts 
to new limitations on the Commerce Clause). 
 130 See Sara C. Benesh and Wendy L. Martinek, Context and Compliance: A Com-
parison of State Supreme Courts and the Circuits, 93 Marq L Rev 795, 795 n 1 (2009) 
(citing dozens of scholarly works on lower-court compliance).  
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busing, and the death penalty. Less obviously, one might consider 
issues like mandatory arbitration and access to the civil-
litigation system, fields in which the Supreme Court’s decisions 
have recently met resistance in certain precincts of the judiciary.131 
Nonetheless, without totally dismissing the notion that the 
Supreme Court might sometimes follow the lower courts in order 
to improve compliance, it seems unlikely to occur very often. In-
ertia is real, but most lower courts will try to adjust course, even 
if they do not turn on a dime. As for the possibility of more ac-
tive resistance, in most cases the lower courts’ preferences are 
not so intense that trying to accommodate them would provide a 
major reason for choosing one view over another. Lower-court 
judges might have their own views on whether a floating home 
is a “vessel” according to the definition in 1 USC § 3,132 but most 
of them will not go to the barricades over it. When preferences 
are intense, they are likely to be intense on the Supreme Court 
too, such that the justices would not be willing to change their 
views as an accommodation. 
Moreover, when compliance is a real concern, the Supreme 
Court has other strategies at its disposal besides agreeing with 
the larger group of lower courts. The Court can use hard-edged 
rules rather than flexible standards, as the former are typically 
thought to constrain more effectively and to make it easier to de-
tect noncompliance.133 It can shift the locus of decisionmaking 
authority, as has arguably happened with the Federal Arbitration 
Act,134 in regard to which the Supreme Court has taken 
decisionmaking opportunities away from courts, especially state 
courts, and given them over to private arbitrators.135 And there 
is always the fact that certiorari is discretionary, which provides 
 
 131 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and 
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 NYU L Rev 1420, 1432–36, 1456–63 (2008). 
See also Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v Howard, 133 S Ct 500, 503 (2012) (per curiam) 
(vacating a state court decision that “disregard[ed]” Supreme Court precedents and 
evinced “hostility” toward arbitration). 
 132 That was the question at issue in Lozman v City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 133 S 
Ct 735, 739 (2013). 
 133 See, for example, Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 Notre 
Dame L Rev 2045, 2048–49 (2008); Tonja Jacobi and Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine 
and Political Control, 23 J L, Econ & Org 326, 339 (2007). 
 134 9 USC § 1 et seq. 
 135 See Bruhl, 83 NYU L Rev at 1470 (cited in note 131). 
01 BRUHL_ART_SOFTA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/5/14 11:21 AM 
2014] Following Lower-Court Precedent 885 
 
the Court with the option of withdrawing from the scene and let-
ting the divided lower courts do as they wish.136 
All in all, worries about lower-court compliance are, and 
should be, quite low on the list of the Court’s concerns. 
F. Constraint 
The debate over interpretive methodology remains obsessed 
with the quest for objectivity.137 Originalists and textualists in 
particular seem fixated on constraining the willful judge who 
would import his or her own preferences into legal texts rather 
than neutrally apply the law.138 And yet evidence from actual ju-
dicial practice casts doubt on originalists’ and textualists’ claims 
that careful analyses of language and textual canons have much 
constraining effect.139  
If one really wants constraint, the lower courts furnish a 
way to achieve it. Instead of reaching its own decisions on the 
merits, the Supreme Court could simply tally up the “votes” of 
the lower courts—five circuits say the statute means X, two say 
the opposite—and declare which position has the most supporters. 
Thus could we fulfill the dream of justices as umpires or, more 
accurately in this vision, as scorekeepers. 
The vision of the Supreme Court as scorekeeper is mostly a 
thought experiment, but it is not totally without appeal. Among 
the Court’s essential functions, on many accounts, is to act as 
the ultimate adjudicator of the meaning of federal law.140 That 
settlement function does not depend on the content of the 
Court’s decisions; in principle, the Court could settle the law by 
flipping a coin. Of course, according to the epistemic rationale 
discussed earlier, the majority view of the lower courts should be 
 
 136 Compare the withdrawal option with McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Posi-
tive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S Cal L Rev 1631, 1641–47 (1995) 
(developing a theory of doctrine formation according to which the Supreme Court expands 
the range of acceptable lower-court decisions in the face of substantial noncompliance). 
 137 See Frank B. Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation 19–22 
(Stanford 2009) (identifying constraint as a key concern motivating disputes about inter-
pretive theory).  
 138 See, for example, Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Inter-
pretation of Legal Texts 9–28 (West 2012); Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword, in Scalia 
and Garner, Reading Law xxi, xxii–xxiii (cited in note 138). 
 139 See Cross, Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation at 166, 175–79 (cited 
in note 137); James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elu-
sive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 Vand L Rev 1, 6, 57–60 (2005). 
 140 See, for example, Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv L Rev 1359, 1377 (1997). 
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of a higher quality than the outcome one would get from flipping 
a coin. (The more faith one reposes in the Jury Theorem as an 
apt model for how the lower courts work, or the more one could 
shift the lower courts toward satisfying the Theorem’s condi-
tions, such as by weakening intercircuit deference, the happier 
one should be with treating lower-court outputs as binding.) 
Additionally, the model of Court-as-scorekeeper should make it 
easier for the Court to decide cases, so that the Court could set-
tle more conflicts than it does today. 
Still, even granting that constraint is an important goal, 
this is probably not the sort of constraint that many people have 
in mind. Justice Antonin Scalia may champion the importance of 
constrained decisionmaking, but he has expressly rejected the 
notion that the Court does or should elevate certainty and objec-
tivity to such a degree that the Court simply ratifies lower-court 
consensus.141 In this he is surely not alone. It would seem rather 
bizarre to have nine justices, a marble building, and all the rest if 
the Court’s highest function were to serve as a glorified tabulator. 
Further, the scorekeeper model, if openly announced, would 
cause trouble in the lower courts. Presumably they should still 
decide cases on the merits, rather than by counting noses. (Or 
would the courts of appeals count up district court decisions? If 
so, then the content of federal law would be left to courts at the 
bottom of the pyramid, which inhabit the least favorable envi-
ronment for deciding questions of law.142) The stakes in the 
courts of appeals would be high in the early stages of a conflict, 
when it would still be unclear which view would come to repre-
sent the majority. Judges might rush to decide questions in or-
der to amplify their influence. But then, once a clear winning 
position emerged, lower courts would jump on the bandwagon, 
as independent decisionmaking would waste time and generate 
(what would soon be declared to be) error. For these and other 
reasons, it may be that candidly announcing a policy of following 
the lower courts would change their behavior in such a way that 
one would no longer want to follow them.143 
 
 141 See Brogan v United States, 522 US 398, 407–08 (1998). 
 142 See Salve Regina College v Russell, 499 US 225, 232 (1991) (explaining that appel-
late courts are structurally superior to trial courts at correctly deciding questions of law). 
 143 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation 
in Criminal Law, 97 Harv L Rev 625, 632–34 (1984) (exploring the possibility that less-
than-candid communications between decisionmakers and the regulated audience can 
serve worthy social ends). 
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G. Summary and Examples 
1. When should the lower courts matter most and when 
should they matter least? 
As set out above, there are a number of distinct reasons for 
the Supreme Court to give weight to the views of lower courts. 
The views of the lower courts might shed light on the truth of 
the matter, for example, or they may simply represent a status 
quo that it would be unwise to upset. As we have also seen, how-
ever, some of the rationales are more powerful than others, and 
all of them have their limits. It is time to bring the different 
strands of the analysis together and see if there are any broader 
conclusions to be drawn. I see three such conclusions, which con-
cern the size of the lower-court majority, its duration, and the 
type of legal question involved. 
First, and probably most clearly, the force of the case for fol-
lowing lower courts depends on how decisively the lower courts 
have settled on one view over another. If the lower courts have 
overwhelmingly ruled one particular way, that will often provide 
a good reason to endorse that view, but a narrower majority 
should rarely merit the Supreme Court’s respect. This is so for a 
few reasons. To begin with, the stability argument is quite pow-
erful when most courts (including, to add more nuance, the 
courts that represent the bulk of the regulated public) have 
adopted one view, but it has little force when any Supreme 
Court decision on the merits would change the law in much of 
the country anyway. Acquiescence, though rarely a powerful 
argument even in the case of lower-court consensus, loses prac-
tically all its force when the lower courts are so closely divided 
that there is no single view in which Congress could acquiesce. I 
have explained why the epistemic argument has limited scope, 
but it is more powerful the more unevenly the lower courts are 
divided. It is true that on the constraint rationale—according to 
which the Supreme Court should simply declare the majority 
view the winner—even a narrow advantage makes a winner, but 
exalting the bare value of constraint per se fits too poorly with 
our current practices to be very persuasive. 
Second, and for somewhat similar reasons, duration mat-
ters. The duration of lower-court views clearly matters on the 
stability rationale, because reliance interests grow as law be-
comes more entrenched. Arguments based on pragmatism also 
require that some time has passed, in order to let consequences 
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manifest themselves. Duration plausibly counts as a plus factor 
on the acquiescence rationale and the compliance rationale, 
though the latter in particular should not carry much weight in 
any event. Duration seems ambiguous on the epistemic ration-
ale, in the sense that one can come up with stories that cut ei-
ther way. 
Third—and here there is more to say—the type of question 
before the Court matters. The Court should be less willing to fol-
low lower-court views in constitutional cases than in cases in-
volving statutory interpretation and common law. There are 
several reasons for this. To begin with, the optimal balance be-
tween the values of judicial accuracy and judicial settlement dif-
fers because of the divergent legislative roles across the two con-
texts.144 Although one should hesitate before concluding that 
Congress has blessed a particular judicial interpretation 
through inaction,145 legislative revision of statutory interpreta-
tions and common law is at least a real possibility. Additionally, 
legislatures can provide reliance-protecting transitional relief 
that courts often cannot. These factors provide some reason for 
the Supreme Court to adhere to settled lower-court positions in 
nonconstitutional domains. By contrast, were the Supreme 
Court to embrace an erroneous constitutional position by following 
the lower courts, correction via the onerous Article V amend-
ment process would be the only nonjudicial remedy. 
An additional reason why lower-court decisions should carry 
less weight in constitutional cases is that judicial decisionmak-
ing in constitutional cases looks quite different at different levels 
of the hierarchy. Virtually every field of constitutional law is 
thick with Supreme Court precedent. Statutory cases tend to be 
less cluttered with precedent, if for no other reason than the 
vast number of statutes—with new ones always cropping up and 
old ones being amended—which means that the Supreme Court 
can address only a fraction of the interpretive questions. Lower-
court decisionmaking in constitutional cases is therefore espe-
cially doctrinal in character, focusing largely on parsing the 
holdings (and dicta) of prior Supreme Court cases.146 The Supreme 
 
 144 For a similar observation regarding the Court’s willingness to overrule its own 
decisions, see Burnet v Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 US 393, 406–08 (1932) (Brandeis 
dissenting). 
 145 See Part II.C. 
 146 See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 Harv L 
Rev 145, 150 (2008) (“[I]n many cases lower courts are not even trying to directly engage 
the Constitution, but are instead simply parsing the Court’s case law—something that 
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Court’s own constitutional decisionmaking, in contrast, has a 
freer character, because the Court can overrule its precedents 
and more easily disregard inconvenient dicta.147 Thus, it is espe-
cially common in constitutional cases for the question in the 
Supreme Court to look different, and more open, than the ques-
tion appeared in the lower courts. To the extent that the Supreme 
Court is engaged in a different enterprise than the lower judici-
ary, the value of attending to the latter’s decisions declines, es-
pecially on the epistemic rationale. 
To be sure, from time to time the lower courts do address a 
constitutional question on a relatively blank slate. In such cases, 
lower courts often (though not always) turn to originalism. A 
leading recent example of lower-court originalism is the DC Cir-
cuit’s decision invalidating President Barack Obama’s recess 
appointments to the National Labor Relations Board.148 The 
court’s opinion endeavored to find the original meaning of the 
relevant constitutional text and relied heavily on early history, 
eschewing more recent practice and sister-circuit precedents.149 
Originalism is an interpretive method that might ask too much of 
all judges—even those assisted by the most-able clerks and most-
erudite historical amicus briefs150—but the method is especially 
difficult in resource-constrained lower courts. This is another 
reason why the lower courts are relatively less likely to have 
useful input in constitutional cases. 
Although the discussion so far has grouped common law 
and statutory law together, distinguishing both of them from 
constitutional law, it may be that common law cases (to the extent 
 
the Court thinks it can usually do quite well on its own, thank you.”); Sanford Levinson, 
On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 25 Conn L Rev 843, 849–50 (1993). This is not to deny the heavy emphasis on 
doctrine and precedential analysis even in the Supreme Court. See Amar, 122 Harv L 
Rev at 147 (cited in note 146); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 63 U Chi L Rev 877, 883–84 (1996). The balance between different modes of analy-
sis is a matter of degrees, not absolutes. 
 147 See, for example, Central Virginia Community College v Katz, 546 US 356, 363 
(2006). See also Knox v Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 132 S Ct 
2277, 2299 (2012) (Sotomayor concurring in the judgment) (charging the majority with 
recharacterizing an “explicit holding” as an “offhand remark”). 
 148 See Noel Canning v NLRB, 705 F3d 490, 514 (DC Cir 2013). 
 149 See Noel Canning, 705 F3d at 500–02, 505–12. 
 150 Even some judges have acknowledged that sophisticated historical research may 
be beyond their ken. See, for example, McDonald v City of Chicago, Illinois, 130 S Ct 
3020, 3121–22 (2010) (Breyer dissenting); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Cosmic Constitutional 
Theory: Why Americans Are Losing Their Inalienable Right to Self-Governance 50–52 
(Oxford 2012). 
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that they find their way to the Supreme Court) present a special 
jurisprudential reason for deference to lower-court majorities. 
When a court considers the meaning of a statute or a constitu-
tional provision, the court seems to aim at something outside of 
the judicial system, something that other courts have previously 
aimed at but have not themselves defined through their very 
acts of deciding. But if one wants to know what the common law 
is, the fact that most courts have for some time said that the law 
is X comes closer to establishing that X truly is the law. Now, to 
be clear, the preceding sentences contain a number of highly 
contestable jurisprudential propositions: a realist-inspired view 
could deny that any type of law has an external existence, while 
an opposing view could insist that even the common law is merely 
discovered by courts rather than created by them.151 Nonethe-
less, there is a palpable and plausible sense in which judicial de-
cisions create the common law in a way that they do not in other 
domains. If so, the Supreme Court has more reason to attend to 
lower-court precedent in common law cases than in others. Even 
Justice Scalia, in an opinion generally rejecting the maxim 
communis error facit jus (that is, the idea that common error 
can, by virtue of its prevalence, constitute law), accepted the no-
tion that common opinion essentially is the common law.152 
* * * 
To summarize, then, the views of the lower courts have their 
greatest force when the lower courts have decisively and for a 
long time embraced a particular view of the law, particularly on 
matters of common law and statutory interpretation, and espe-
cially when there has been reliance. Many such situations arise 
at the certiorari stage, and usually the Court should and does 
deny review. At the merits stage, such circumstances will there-
fore appear fairly rarely, and so there will be relatively few cases 
in which the views of the lower courts should loom large in the 
Court’s reasoning—though there will be some. Part III will 
provide a more concrete sense of how many such cases there are 
and how the Court responds to them. 
 
 151 See William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 69–70 (Legal 
Classics spec ed 1983) (“[S]ubsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to 
vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision 
is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but 
that it was not law.”). 
 152 See Brogan, 522 US at 407 n 3, 408. 
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2. Examples. 
Some examples may be helpful in illustrating the circum-
stances in which the lower courts should or should not exert in-
fluence. For a recent example of a case in which the Supreme 
Court should have, but did not, follow a lower-court consensus, 
consider Taniguchi v Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.153 Federal law 
provides that prevailing parties may recover the costs of a lawsuit, 
which are defined to include “compensation of interpreters.”154 
The question before the Court was whether such compensation 
includes costs associated with document translation as well as 
the more obviously included oral translations. Almost all of the 
lower courts to have considered the question had said yes, but 
the majority of the Supreme Court answered no.155 The dissent—
penned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and joined by Justices 
Breyer and Sotomayor—argued that allowing the costs of writ-
ten translation was at least a permissible interpretation of the 
text, furthered the statutory purposes, and comported with the 
lower-court consensus.156 The dissent’s call for downward defer-
ence in this case drew support from several distinct rationales. 
First of all, although there admittedly does not appear to be a 
good private-reliance argument—nobody orders their primary 
conduct based on whether they would later be able to recover 
translation costs in a lawsuit—there is a governmental-reliance 
argument stemming from the fact that more than a dozen federal 
courts had provided for the recovery of translation services in their 
local rules or the like.157 Further, Congress did not upset these 
long-standing practices—and arguably blessed them—when it 
amended the relevant statute.158 From the perspective of the 
pragmatic rationale, this long-standing interpretation had not 
revealed serious practical difficulties.159 Finally, the epistemic ar-
gument seems relatively strong here given the size of the lower-
court majority and the topic: a question of trial practice that 
lower courts arguably understand better than the Supreme 
Court. 
 
 153 132 S Ct 1997 (2012). 
 154 Id at 1999–2000, quoting 28 USC § 1920(6). 
 155 See Taniguchi, 132 S Ct at 2007; id at 2008 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 156 See id at 2008–10 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 157 See id at 2009 n 2 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 158 See id at 2008–09 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
 159 See Taniguchi, 132 S Ct at at 2010–11 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
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For a prominent example of a case in which there was very lit-
tle reason to follow the lower courts, consider National Federation 
of Independent Business v Sebelius,160 the 2012 case addressing 
the constitutional challenge to the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act.161 A majority of the courts of appeals to con-
sider the constitutionality of the individual mandate upheld it as 
a valid exercise of the commerce power,162 but all of the lower-court 
decisions were necessarily very recent, so nothing like a settled 
view had developed. Nor had enough time passed to observe the 
consequences of the different approaches, especially since the 
mandate itself was not even scheduled to take effect for a few 
years.163 Finally, the fact that this case touched on constitutional 
questions of tremendous moment means that the lower courts 
were unlikely to offer much useful guidance.164 And so, although 
the Court did end up agreeing with the lower-court majority that 
the mandate was constitutional—though, famously, because it 
was a tax rather than a regulation of “commerce”165—there is no 
reason to think that the lower courts’ decisions should have had 
any authoritative value. (Further, given the political stakes in 
the case, it is hard to imagine that the Supreme Court would 
have followed the lower courts even if it should have.) 
As the previously discussed case of Padilla v Kentucky 
shows, sometimes even an overwhelming consensus of the lower 
courts merits little respect. As observed earlier, there was no 
serious reliance problem with overturning the settled law in 
Padilla.166 But neither did the lower-court consensus require 
deference based on other rationales. In a constitutional case 
such as this, acquiescence has little relevance, and the lower 
courts’ parsing of the implications of the Supreme Court’s prior 
decisions holds little value for the Supreme Court itself. 
 
 160 132 S Ct 2566 (2012) (“NFIB”). 
 161 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 162 One court of appeals struck down the mandate on the merits, two upheld it on 
the merits, and one declined to reach the question on jurisdictional grounds. NFIB, 132 S 
Ct at 2581.  
 163 See id at 2580, quoting 26 USC § 5000A(b)(1) (noting that penalties for noncom-
pliance with the mandate would begin in 2014).  
 164 See, for example, Thomas More Law Center v Obama, 651 F3d 529, 559 (6th Cir 
2011) (Sutton concurring in part) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has considerable 
discretion in resolving this dispute [over the ACA],” but that “lower court judges [have] 
the duty to respect the language and direction of the Court’s precedents”). 
 165 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2608 (Roberts) (plurality). 
 166 See notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
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III.  DESCRIBING AND MEASURING THE CURRENT SUPREME 
COURT’S PRACTICES 
With the benefit of the theoretical framework and cate-
gories developed above, let us now consider the Supreme 
Court’s practices. 
Some years ago, Professor Arthur Hellman described the 
apparent emergence of an “Olympian” Supreme Court that was 
in various respects quite different from, and detached from, the 
more ordinary courts below it.167 One way in which such aloof 
detachment can manifest itself is through an indifference toward 
the lower courts’ struggles to resolve the difficult questions that 
eventually find their way onto the Supreme Court’s docket. And, 
indeed, the impression of some informed observers is that the 
Supreme Court has, for at least the last few decades, not cared 
much about the views of the lower courts. In 1998, one of the na-
tion’s most accomplished appellate litigators wrote that the 
Supreme Court was “less concerned about lower-court precedent 
than at anytime in the twenty years that I have been watching 
this Court. The only real precedent that matters to this Supreme 
Court is this Court’s precedent.”168 Some lower-court judges, 
writing at around the same time, shared that assessment.169 
Similarly, Professors Eskridge and Frickey, in their study of the 
Court’s 1993 Term, discerned a tendency for the Court to disre-
gard settled law—including long-standing lower-court prece-
dent—in the pursuit of a dogmatic form of textualism that ele-
vated idiosyncratic readings of text over rule-of-law values like 
stability and predictability.170 All of these observers were well in-
formed, but it would be valuable to consider the situation today 
 
 167 Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 S Ct Rev 
403, 432–38. 
 168 Carter G. Phillips, Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court, 15 Cooley L 
Rev 177, 180 (1998).  
 169 Consider the impression of Judge Patricia Wald of the DC Circuit, who in 1993 
observed “little indication the Justices found in [lower-court] decisions a prolific source of 
analyses or insights. . . . One senses that the Justices are, more and more, reacting to 
each other and to the implications of their decisions rather than drawing on the wisdom 
of lower court rationales.” Wald, 61 U Cin L Rev at 792 (cited in note 127). Writing twenty 
years before that, Judge Friendly saw things similarly but was less troubled by the pos-
sibility that the Supreme Court would mostly overlook the lower courts’ insights: “If a 
case involves questions of federal law of such importance as to be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, the views of the court of appeals count, and should count, for little.” Henry J. 
Friendly, The “Law of the Circuit” and All That: Foreword to the Second Circuit 1970 
Term, 46 St John’s L Rev 406, 407 (1972).  
 170 See Eskridge and Frickey, 108 Harv L Rev at 76–81 (cited in note 30). 
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and, if possible, to provide an account that is more systematic. 
Are the lower courts an important input in contemporary Supreme 
Court decisionmaking? To the extent that the lower courts do 
matter, which of the rationales explored in Part II do the current 
justices find persuasive? 
To answer those questions, I set out to investigate, in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms, the current Supreme Court’s 
use of lower-court precedent. Although some of my research and 
conclusions cover longer periods, I focus most heavily on three 
recent Supreme Court terms that cover the period from October 
2010 through June 2013. These terms capture the first three 
years of the Court as currently constituted—that is, since Justice 
Kagan replaced Justice Stevens. I used a combination of various 
approaches, including running word searches in electronic data-
bases and skimming every case from those years to look for re-
sults that the search terms may have missed.171 
I investigated both what the Court does (voting) and what it 
says (reasoning). Both inquiries are important. Relying simply 
on what the Court says in its opinions is obviously risky, as the 
Court might use lower-court opinions opportunistically, invoking 
them when it is convenient but ignoring them when they stand 
in the way. Or perhaps the Court is influenced without acknowl-
edging it. Yet focusing solely on counting votes creates a prob-
lem of causal interpretation: if the Court usually agrees with the 
majority of the lower courts on an issue, that need not indicate 
any deference or even influence but may just prove that the 
law supplies a pretty clearly correct answer that most jurists 
 
 171 More precisely, I emphasized different approaches for different aspects of the 
study. For Part III.A’s analysis of how the Supreme Court ruled in circuit splits, I 
skimmed every opinion looking for mention of how the lower courts were divided. I also 
electronically searched each opinion for citations to the Federal Reporter (that is, “F.”) to 
assist in this task. For Part III.B, which examines invocations of the lower courts in the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning, I relied primarily on word searches in the Westlaw Supreme 
Court database. I first ran the following search: “(universal! or uniform! or consensus or 
every or majority or most or unanim! or minority or bulk or practice or numerous or all 
or other or almost or settled) /s (“lower court” or circuit or “other court” or “court of ap-
peals” or “other judge” or “state court” or “state supreme court” or “state high court”).” I 
then followed up with searches targeted at particular rationales for invoking the lower 
courts, using terms like “acquiesc!” and “consequence.” All of these database searches 
were substantially overinclusive, returning many false positives that had to be eliminated. 
But because the Court need not use any particular formula of words when it relies on 
lower-court precedent, nor even cite particular decisions, no word search can catch every 
instance, so skimming all of the decisions caught some additional cases. Despite the mul-
tiple approaches, I certainly cannot rule out having missed some relevant invocations of 
the lower courts. 
01 BRUHL_ART_SOFTA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/5/14 11:21 AM 
2014] Following Lower-Court Precedent 895 
 
independently select.172 Ideally, one would perform an experi-
ment in which the Supreme Court is blinded to what happened 
in the lower courts. If the rate of agreement decreased in the 
blinded condition, that would provide some evidence of causal 
influence. Unfortunately, no such experiment seems possible. 
But perhaps what the Court says about lower-court precedent 
can help us decide which interpretation of the facts—influence 
or mere coincidental correspondence—is correct. While acknowl-
edging the limits of any particular type of evidence, we might 
gain some confidence in our conclusions if we are able to com-
bine multiple strands of qualitative and quantitative evidence, 
along with a convincing jurisprudential account of the findings. 
The investigation of the Court’s practices yielded a variety 
of findings, some expected and some more surprising. I recount 
them below, beginning with the Supreme Court’s voting behavior. 
Then I turn to the Supreme Court’s statements and attempt to 
identify and categorize every instance since the appointment of 
Justice Kagan three years ago in which the Supreme Court has 
invoked the support of lower courts. 
A. The Court’s Voting Behavior 
Although it is widely recognized that the Supreme Court 
issues far more reversals than affirmances—it reversed in 
around 70–75 percent of the cases argued before it in recent 
years173—that simple observation actually tells us very little about 
how often the Court agrees with the lower courts. When the 
Court reverses the decision directly under review, the Court 
might be indirectly “affirming” several other courts that had 
come out on the other side of the legal question at issue. Indeed, 
the decision being reversed might have represented the minority 
view in the lower courts. A more meaningful measure of the 
Court’s behavior would take this phenomenon of indirect or 
 
 172 See, for example, Tinklenberg, 131 S Ct at 2018 (Scalia concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment): 
The clarity of the text is doubtless why, as the Court’s opinion points out, every 
Circuit disagrees with the [decision under review]. That is the direction in 
which the causality proceeds: Clarity of text produces unanimity of Circuits—
not, as the Court’s opinion would have it, unanimity of Circuits clarifies text. 
(citation omitted). 
 173 Lee Epstein, et al, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Devel-
opments 271 (Sage 5th ed 2012). 
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parallel review into account, and several scholars have recently 
published studies that attempt to do so.174 
To briefly summarize some key findings from that literature: 
Professors Stefanie Lindquist and David Klein, in a methodologi-
cally sophisticated study of circuit-conflict cases from 1985–95, 
found that the justices were more likely to vote for a particular 
position as the relative support in the lower courts for that posi-
tion increased.175 Studies of circuit splits from more recent years 
reach similar conclusions. Although the precise figures vary de-
pending on the years studied and the methodology employed, 
these measures show that the Supreme Court tends to resolve 
splits by siding with the majority of the circuits.176 
If the goal is to investigate the potential influence of lower 
courts (versus mere independent correspondence of results), not 
all splits are equally informative. When the circuits are closely 
divided on some issue, splitting 3–2 or 7–5, it is hard to see why 
that would provide much reason for the Supreme Court to agree 
with the slight majority. Such a close division hardly represents 
any clear consensus but rather just suggests that the question 
involved is particularly difficult. Nor could one accuse the Court 
of upsetting a settled equilibrium whichever way it ruled. It is 
therefore particularly worth examining the Court’s handling of 
more lopsided splits, such as 7–1. To be clear, a finding that the 
Supreme Court usually sides with lopsided lower-court majori-
ties does not necessarily show causal influence. It may simply 
show that courts independently tend to converge on legally cor-
rect answers in easy cases. Indeed, Lindquist and Klein treated 
lower-court support as a proxy for legal soundness, as they 
aimed to test the relative importance of legal soundness versus 
ideology as competing determinants of Supreme Court decisions.177 
 
 174 See, for example, Tom Cummins and Adam Aft, Appellate Review, 2 J Legal Metrics 
59, 68–72 (2012); Hansford, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at 1146, 1154–61 (cited in note 64); Ste-
fanie A. Lindquist and David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations 
on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 L & Soc Rev 135, 151–
57 (2006); John S. Summers and Michael J. Newman, Towards a Better Measure and 
Understanding of U.S. Supreme Court Review of Courts of Appeals Decisions, 80 USLW 
393, 394–96 (2011). 
 175 See Lindquist and Klein, 40 L & Soc Rev at 144, 148 (cited in note 174). 
 176 See Tom Cummins and Adam Aft, Appellate Review II: October Term 2011, 3 J 
Legal Metrics 37, 38 (2013); Hansford, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at 1165 (cited in note 64); 
Summers and Newman, 80 USLW at 395 (cited in note 174). The Supreme Court’s 
agreement rate is lower if one considers all cases rather than only those resolving splits; 
that is because nonsplit cases are often exercises in error correction. See Summers and 
Newman, 80 USLW at 395 (cited in note 174).  
 177 See Lindquist and Klein, 40 L & Soc Rev at 141–43 (cited in note 174). 
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If one wants to get at the role of lower-court decisions as influ-
ences, then potentially the most revealing cases are those in 
which the Supreme Court rejects a lopsided majority. In such 
cases, other factors—perhaps ideology or perhaps the justices’ 
independent assessment of legal correctness—trump lower-court 
consensus. Such rejections of the lower courts do not mean that 
the lower courts exerted no influence at all, but if there are 
many such rejections, it would at least show that the influence is 
not great. Again, somewhat firmer inferences become available 
when one supplements this Section’s study of the Court’s voting 
behavior with Part III.B’s study of what the Court’s opinions say 
about the force of lower-court precedent. 
1. Findings from a study of recent terms. 
Measuring the Supreme Court’s handling of lopsided splits 
requires both a definition of lopsidedness and a method for iden-
tifying lopsided splits. Regarding the definition, any particular 
cutoff is somewhat arbitrary, but let us define a lopsided divi-
sion as one in which one side of the dispute has at least four 
more circuits (or state high courts) than the other side (for ex-
ample, a 7–3 split), including cases in which the lower courts are 
not divided at all (for example, 4–0 “splits”). Note that this Sec-
tion uses the lower court as the unit of analysis for measuring 
divisions, rather than calculating divisions in terms of how 
many judges are on each side, how much of the nation’s popula-
tion is represented by the relevant courts, or other metrics. The 
various rationales for deferring to the lower courts can prioritize 
different units of measurement. But the court is the most common 
unit and the one that the Supreme Court itself seems to treat as 
the most meaningful when it reports lower-court conflicts. 
To identify the cases, I began by examining the Supreme 
Court’s opinions. That effort included searching concurrences 
and dissents for splits that majority opinions did not reveal. By 
actually looking at the opinions, one captures some cases that 
would be missed if one relied solely on Professor Harold Spaeth’s 
Supreme Court Database to identify splits.178 A more difficult 
 
 178 See Supreme Court Database: 2013 Release 01 (July 17, 2013), online at 
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php?s=2 (visited Aug 12, 2014). The Database, 
which is widely used in the empirical literature, codes each case for many variables, 
including the reason (if any) that the Court gave for granting certiorari. See Harold 
Spaeth, et al, Supreme Court Database Code Book *34, 94 (July 17, 2013), online at 
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/_brickFiles/2013_01/SCDB_2013_01_codebook.pdf (visited 
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methodological choice is whether one should go outside the four 
corners of the decisions (that is, by consulting briefs and lower-
court opinions) in an effort to (1) challenge the Supreme Court’s 
characterization of splits, or (2) detect additional splits. The issue 
of which materials to consult is an important one, and I discuss 
the competing considerations of accuracy and objectivity be-
low.179 For purposes of Table 1, I relied on the decisions them-
selves to characterize a split; that is, if an opinion presented a 
split as 5–1, I did not go behind that characterization in order to 
see whether my sense of the “true” circuit count was instead 4–1 
or 3–3.180 (In a few cases, the language in the opinion clearly sig-
naled a lopsided split but did not purport to provide a full ac-
counting; Table 1 includes these without listing a specific count.) 
Likewise, Table 1 does not include lopsided splits that could be 
identified only by considering sources extrinsic to the Court’s 
opinions. I did look beyond the four corners of the opinions for 
other purposes, as discussed later. 
Using the method described above, one can arrange the lop-
sided splits based on how lopsided the lower courts were and 
which way the Supreme Court ruled. In Table 1, the cases are 
listed according to the size of the lower-court differential. That 
is, +7 means that one side of the split had seven more lower 
courts than the other, and the Supreme Court sided with that 
lopsided majority; negative numbers mean that the Court sided 
with the lower-court minority. The table shows (via bullet 
points) which justices sided with the lower-court majority on the 
point that is the subject of the split.181 (Recusals are indicated by 
a “-”.) The table also indicates the ideological direction of the 
Supreme Court’s decision on the relevant issue when there is a 
 
Aug 12, 2014). Relying on the Database’s coding undercounts circuit splits because the 
Database does not code a case as resolving a split unless the Supreme Court expressly 
describes that as the reason for the grant, even when the Court points out the division of 
authority in close proximity to the mention of the grant. Further, I am interested in cap-
turing cases that are not necessarily splits, such as cases in which several lower courts 
have all answered the question the same way.  
 179 See Part III.A.2. 
 180 If the majority opinion and other opinions explicitly disagreed on the count, I de-
ferred to the majority rather than taking sides. However, I followed a separate opinion’s 
characterization if it was not controverted by the majority opinion. 
 181 I report the voting lineups on the question that is the subject of the lopsided 
split. Those lineups do not necessarily coincide with votes on the case disposition; for ex-
ample, a concurrence in the judgment might actually agree with the dissent on the ques-
tion that divided the lower courts. 
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clear ideological aspect.182 For example, in Lafler v Cooper,183 
from October Term 2011, Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the 
Court’s liberal camp (Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan) in a liberal decision that agreed with all ten of the lower 
courts to have addressed a particular question.184 It is thus 
scored +10. An appendix on file with the author and the editors 
provides additional details on how the results were derived. 
 
 182 Here I employ conventional criteria for ideology; for instance, liberal votes are 
those that favor employees, consumers, tort plaintiffs, and criminal defendants over em-
ployers, businesses, tort defendants, and prosecutors, respectively. See Lee Epstein and 
Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (but 
We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U Pa J Const L 263, 272 (2010). Note that the table records the 
direction of the decision on the issue that was the topic of the split. Thus, Martel v Clair, 
132 S Ct 1276 (2012), is listed as liberal because of the Court’s pro-criminal-defendant 
ruling on the legal standard at issue, even though the Court went on to apply that stan-
dard to deny habeas relief on the particular facts before it. Id at 1284–89. 
 183 132 S Ct 1376 (2012).  
 184 As Lafler illustrates, a given case can present multiple legal questions (or 
subquestions), some of which might feature lopsided splits and others not. The Lafler 
Court agreed with all of the circuits regarding whether a criminal defendant’s receipt of 
poor advice resulting in the rejection of a plea agreement can constitute ineffective assis-
tance of counsel (thus the +10 rating), though the Court vacated the decision below be-
cause it disagreed with how the violation at issue had been remedied. See id at 1385, 
1391. A similar situation is presented by Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 132 S Ct 694, 701–02, 707 
(2012), in which the Supreme Court agreed with the court below (and other circuits) that 
there existed a “ministerial exception” to antidiscrimination laws but disagreed with the 
court below regarding how to apply the exception to the litigant before it. 
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TABLE 1. LOPSIDED CASES AS REVEALED IN THE SUPREME 
COURT’S OPINIONS: 2010, 2011, AND 2012 TERMS 
Voting with Lower-Court Majority 
Case / Conflict 
Differential J
G
R
 
A
S
 
A
M
K
 
C
T
 
S
A
A
 
R
B
G
 
S
G
B
 
S
S
 
E
K
 
Ideology 
of Ruling 
Supreme Court Agreement with Lopsided Majority,  
by Size of Differential  
Martel v Clair (OT11) 
large ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● lib 
CSX v McBride (OT10) 
large    ●  ● ● ● ● lib 
Borough of Duryea v Guarnieri (OT10) 
large ●  ●  ● ● ● ● ● cons 
Hosanna-Tabor v EEOC (OT11) 
+12 (12–0) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● cons 
Lafler v Cooper (OT11) 
+10 (10–0)   ●   ● ● ● ● lib 
United States v Tinklenberg (OT10) 
+10 (11–1) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● - cons 
Perry v New Hampshire (OT11)  
+8 (11–3) ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  ● cons 
Coleman v Court of Appeals of Maryland (OT11)  
+7 (7–0) ● ● ● ● ●     cons 
Harrington v Richter (OT10)  
+7 (7–0) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● - cons 
Abbott v United States (OT10) 
+6 (8–2) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● - cons 
Sossamon v Texas (OT10)  
+5 (6–1) ● ● ● ● ● ●   - cons 
Peugh v United States (OT12) 
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+4 (5–1)   ●   ● ● ● ● lib 
 
Kasten v Saint-Gobain (OT10) 
+4 (6–2) ●  ●  ● ● ● ● - lib 
Supreme Court Disagreement with Lopsided Majority,  
by Size of Differential 
 
Bailey v United States (OT12)  
large     ● ●  ●   lib 
Taniguchi v Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd (OT11) 
-6 (1–7)       ● ● ●  cons 
Cullen v Pinholster (OT10) 
-5a      ●   ●  cons 
Florence v Board of Chosen Freeholders (OT11) 
-4 (4–8)       ● ● ● ● cons 
Williamson v Mazda Motor of America, Inc (OT10)  
-4 (0–4)          - lib 
Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co (OT12)  
-4 (0–4)       ● ● ● ● cons 
FTC v Actavis, Inc (OT12) 
-4b  ● ●  ● -     unclear 
Mims v Arrow Financial Services (OT11) 
-4 (2–6)           unclear 
An appendix on file with the author and the editors provides additional details regarding 
where in the opinions the splits are revealed as well as other information concerning the 
interpretation of the split. 
 
Notes: 
a The Supreme Court majority disagreed with both sides of the circuit split, departing from 
the views of at least five circuits (and probably more). See Cullen v Pinholster, 131 S Ct 
1388, 1417 (2011) (Sotomayor dissenting) (“The majority charts a third, novel course that, so 
far as I am aware, no court of appeals has adopted.”). 
b The Supreme Court majority charted a middle course that disagreed with both sides of the 
circuit split, departing from the views of at least four circuits that had taken more categori-
cal views on either side. See Federal Trade Commission v Actavis, Inc, 133 S Ct 2223, 2230, 
2237 (2013).  
 
Using the methods just described, one can see that the 
Supreme Court sided with the lower-court majority in 13 out of 
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21 lopsided splits (62 percent), including all of the most extremely 
lopsided splits. One should be cautious about putting too much 
faith in the precision of any figures of this sort, for reasons that I 
will expand on shortly, but the results are nonetheless instruc-
tive in several ways. 
The obvious question is whether lower-court consensus exerts 
a constraining effect on the justices’ behavior, leading them to 
vote in ways that they otherwise would not. It is hard to speak 
with certainty, of course, because Supreme Court decisions likely 
reflect a tangled combination of factors, including the formally 
authoritative legal materials, ideological preferences, and (maybe) 
some degree of deference to lower courts. As for the role of ideol-
ogy, that factor cannot completely explain the results in Table 1, 
as there are a number of cases in which a significant group of 
justices side with the lower-court consensus despite the expected 
pull of conflicting ideological inclinations. Two such examples 
are Tinklenberg and Abbott v United States,185 in which all of the 
participating liberal justices voted against the criminal defen-
dant and joined opinions that explicitly invoked the lower-court 
consensus.186 Indeed, although detailed analysis of the justices’ 
reasoning awaits the next Section, it is worth noting that the 
large majority of the cases in Table 1 feature one or more opin-
ions expressly claiming support from most lower courts, which 
arguably suggests that the lower courts played some role in the 
justices’ deliberations. (Or at least that the lower courts played a 
role for certain justices; I return to the interesting matter of dif-
ferences between justices in Part III.B.3.) Still, when the justices 
affirm the lower-court consensus, as in those cases in the top 
half of Table 1, it is hard to know whether the consensus is hav-
ing any causal effect or whether the alignment merely reflects 
multiple independent recognitions that one answer is clearly 
better. Agreement with lopsided majorities is what one would 
expect in either scenario. 
 
 185 131 S Ct 18 (2010). 
 186 Tinklenberg, 131 S Ct at 2014–15 (Breyer) (joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito, 
and Sotomayor); Abbott, 131 S Ct at 23 (Ginsburg) (unanimous). In the majority of the 
instances of counterideological voting in Table 1, it is the Court’s liberal members who 
vote against type. It is hard to form conclusions at this point, but this seems consistent 
with Lindquist and Klein’s study, which found that the liberals on the Court in 1985–95 
were more likely to align with lower-court views than were the conservatives. See Lindquist 
and Klein, 40 L & Soc Rev at 152 (cited in note 174). More defensible conclusions about 
differences between the two camps can be drawn once the voting behavior is supple-
mented with a consideration of the justices’ statements and other evidence. 
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Potentially more revealing are the cases in the bottom half 
of Table 1. The fact that the Court is willing—not in the majority 
of instances, but in an important minority—to buck the lower 
courts shows, if evidence were needed, that the lower courts are 
not controlling on the justices. Put differently, perhaps the head-
line is that the Court disagrees with lopsided lower-court majori-
ties so often.187 Indeed, as I explain in the next Section, there is 
some reason to worry that the Court’s self-reporting understates 
the rate at which it disagrees with lower courts. 
Some of the Court’s decisions that depart from the lower 
courts likely reflect ideological preferences. Classic left-right 
splits are evident, for example, in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co188 (which concerned the reach of the Alien Tort Statute189) and 
Florence v Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington190 
(which concerned the constitutionality of strip searches of de-
tainees191). More interestingly, however, other cases rejecting 
lopsided lower-court majorities are unanimous or otherwise not 
ideologically divided (and there would be more such cases had I 
used a more lenient definition of lopsidedness), which arguably 
demonstrates that conflicting ideological preferences cannot ex-
plain all of the justices’ repudiations of the lower courts. In some 
appreciable number of cases, the bulk of the lower courts have 
simply gotten it wrong, at least from the Supreme Court’s per-
spective, and the fact that the lower courts had largely settled 
on one view was not enough to persuade the Court to follow them. 
It is worth reiterating at this point that the Supreme 
Court’s merits docket is just a small window into the law. Most 
questions generate consensus or outright unanimity in the lower 
courts. If the Court is inclined to agree with the prevailing view, 
 
 187 My data are not directly comparable to the 1985–95 data collected by Lindquist 
and Klein, because they identified circuit splits through the Database, which finds fewer 
cases than my method. See note 178. If I reexamined my data using their method, my 
dataset would contain fewer cases, but it would still show the Court agreeing with lop-
sided lower-court majorities just slightly more than half the time. That rate of agree-
ment is much less than the rate one can derive from their older data, which would show 
the Court agreeing with lopsided lower-court majorities about 70 percent of the time. (I 
thank Lindquist and Klein for sharing their data, which I used to perform that calcula-
tion.) I am reluctant to put too much stock in this comparison across time periods, given 
the limitations of the data, which are discussed in the next Section, but the evidence is at 
least consistent with a scenario in which the Court today is even less concerned about 
the lower courts’ views than it was twenty years ago.  
 188 133 S Ct 1659 (2013).  
 189 28 USC § 1350.  
 190 132 S Ct 1510 (2012).  
 191 Id at 1513. 
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there is little reason to grant review, and therefore such cases 
should rarely make their way onto the merits docket—though, 
as the top of Table 1 shows, they sometimes actually do.192 If the 
Court is inclined to disagree with the prevailing view, it might 
still deny review (especially in matters that are regarded as un-
important or that are amenable to correction by others). Some-
times, though, the Court will disagree with the prevailing view 
and be moved to grant review, perhaps in order to undo what it 
views as the damage being done by so many errant lower courts. 
The Court’s desire to correct widespread error probably influ-
ences the selection of the few issues that make their way onto 
the merits docket out of the many contenders, even if “mere” 
error correction in isolated cases does not play much of a role. 
So, while the existence of any appreciable number of Supreme 
Court decisions rejecting lopsided majorities calls out for expla-
nation, one should not assume that the Supreme Court would 
disagree with the lower courts in almost half of all the lopsided 
splits that do not make it onto the merits docket. 
2. Difficulties in measuring circuit splits—and what those 
difficulties reveal. 
Table 1 comes with several caveats. Although I began this 
project believing that it was more revealing to see what the 
Court does with lower-court precedent through its voting behav-
ior than what it says about the value of lower-court precedent in 
its opinions, I no longer feel very confident that one can get a 
good grasp on what the Court does. The measurement problems 
extend to the prior literature on circuit performance as well, and 
indeed they will beset just about any attempt to measure the 
Court’s behavior in resolving circuit splits.193 Notably, the meth-
 
 192 The Court’s docket included several cases in which it affirmed positions that the 
lower courts had unanimously embraced, which at first glance makes for a surprising 
use of the Court’s certiorari discretion. In some of those cases—Martel and Harrington v 
Richter, 131 S Ct 770 (2011), come to mind—it seems that the Court probably granted 
certiorari in order to correct what it regarded as errant results in particular cases (in 
these two examples, from the Ninth Circuit), but along the way it had to address an an-
tecedent question of law that had not proven particularly controversial. Thus, the Court 
did not grant certiorari in those cases in order to ratify the prevailing law—as it appar-
ently did in Coleman v Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S Ct 1327 (2012)—but rather 
the ratification was merely the by-product of trying to reverse a problematic outcome. 
 193 For an elaboration on these methodological issues, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
Measuring Circuit Splits: A Cautionary Note, 3 J Legal Metrics *2–12 (forthcoming 
2014), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443312 (visited Aug 
12, 2014).  
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odological difficulties derive in part from the Court’s practices, 
practices that show a degree of disregard for the lower courts—a 
finding interesting in itself. 
To elaborate: it turns out that identifying and counting cir-
cuit splits is harder than one might think. One complicating fac-
tor—and one that suggests that the Court is not overly con-
cerned with exactly how many courts line up on either side of a 
circuit split—is that the Court sometimes does not purport to 
list each court of appeals that has weighed in on a question, in-
stead citing an apparent sample of the conflicting decisions194 or 
just stating that the lower courts are split without citing any of 
them.195 
More problematic are situations in which the fact of a split 
is not even revealed within any of the Supreme Court’s opinions 
in a particular case. Quite a few majority opinions state that the 
Court granted certiorari to answer a particular question or sim-
ply state that the Court granted certiorari, period.196 In many of 
those cases, a significant history of lower-court disagreement 
goes unmentioned, as if it had never happened.197 The justices 
 
 194 For instance, the Court’s opinion in Henderson v United States, 133 S Ct 1121 
(2013), uses “compare, e.g.” and reveals only three circuits as participating in the split, id 
at 1125, but the solicitor general’s briefing as respondent at the certiorari stage admitted 
a broader circuit split. See Brief for the United States, Henderson v United States, Docket 
No 11-9307, *13–15 (US filed May 23, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 7069951).  
 195 See, for example, Smith v United States, 133 S Ct 714, 718 (2013); Rehberg v 
Paulk, 132 S Ct 1497, 1501 (2012). Smith is striking because it appears that all or nearly 
all of the circuits had previously addressed the question presented, see Brief for the 
United States in Opposition, Smith v United States, Docket No 11-8976, *24–26 (US filed 
May 14, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 3027176), but none of those numerous 
decisions is cited by the Supreme Court. 
 196 See, for example, Greene v Fisher, 132 S Ct 38, 43 (2011).  
 197 For a notable recent example, see City of Arlington, Texas v Federal Communica-
tions Commission, 133 S Ct 1863 (2013), which concerned whether Chevron deference 
applies to an agency’s determinations of its own jurisdiction. Id at 1866. That question 
had been dividing the lower courts and provoking commentators for years, but Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for the Court does not reveal this history. See City of Arlington, Texas v 
FCC, 668 F3d 229, 248 & nn 91–93 (5th Cir 2012) (citing conflicting cases stretching 
back nearly twenty years). Similarly, the decision in Staub v Proctor Hospital, 131 S Ct 
1186 (2011), which concerned the cat’s paw theory of liability for employment discrimi-
nation, did not reveal that virtually every circuit had weighed in on how to apply that 
theory under several antidiscrimination statutes, that various tests had developed, and 
so forth. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Staub v Proctor Hospital, 
Docket No 09-400, *9 (US filed Mar 16, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 
3611711) (“Staub Amicus Brief”) (mentioning conflicting decisions from twelve circuits). 
Professor Wayne Logan, in a valuable study of Fourth Amendment circuit splits, similarly 
observed that the Supreme Court’s merits decisions often fail to mention the existence of 
long-standing divisions of authority, much less meaningfully engage with the competing 
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differ in their habits in this regard. Justice Scalia has been es-
pecially likely not to mention the existence of a split even when 
one exists.198 This is perhaps not surprising, given his principled 
opposition to giving weight to the views of the lower courts.199 
But one can hold that methodological position and still make it a 
practice to state that the Court is resolving a question that has 
divided the lower courts—and, better still, cite at least some of 
the conflicting decisions. Doing so should hasten the legal sys-
tem’s realization (through citation services and otherwise) that 
some cases are no longer good law. 
To return to Table 1: because its calculations reflect the 
state of the world as reported in the Supreme Court’s opinions, 
some lopsided splits could be missed. And, indeed, my own in-
vestigations beyond the four corners of the opinions show that 
quite a few splits, including at least a few lopsided splits, are not 
revealed within the opinions. Mere undercounting of splits is not 
necessarily problematic, but the greater worry is that the data 
could be biased in systematic ways. One obvious possibility is 
that opinions tend to mention strong support from lower courts 
when doing so bolsters the opinion but obscure lower-court views 
when they are unsupportive. Some tentative support for that 
suspicion comes from the fact that several cases in the bottom 
half of Table 1 appear there only because the Supreme Court 
majority’s departure from the prevailing view in the lower courts 
is revealed in a dissent. In Bailey v United States,200 the majority 
opinion states that the lower courts were divided but does not 
list them;201 not until reading the dissent does one learn that the 
bulk of the circuits had adopted a view contrary to that of the 
 
views. See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the 
Fourth Amendment, 65 Vand L Rev 1137, 1167–69 (2012). 
 198 Both City of Arlington and Staub, discussed in the previous footnote, are Scalia 
opinions. My observations about Scalia’s tendencies accord with those of Professor Arthur 
Hellman, who reported on this feature of Scalia’s opinions some time ago. See Arthur D. 
Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of Intercircuit 
Conflicts, 63 U Pitt L Rev 81, 149 (2001). Note that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy also tended to have few opinions revealing circuit splits in the years that I 
studied, though it may be that their respective roles as chief justice and frequently deci-
sive swing justice garner them a disproportionate share of the assignments in high-
profile constitutional cases in which splits are less important (versus technical statutory 
questions that divide lower courts). 
 199 See Part III.B.3. 
 200 133 S Ct 1031 (2013). 
 201 See id at 1037. 
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Bailey majority.202 There are other similar instances in which a 
majority opinion does not mention that it is rejecting the bulk of 
lower-court authority or describes the split in such a way as to 
obscure the extent of the Court’s break with the lower courts.203 
Perhaps dissents are common when the majority departs from 
prevailing views, but one naturally wonders what happens when 
there is no dissent to flag the issue. 
These suspicions led me to investigate further, and I found 
lopsided splits that were not hinted at in the Supreme Court’s 
opinions at all. For example, in Thompson v North American 
Stainless, LP,204 the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit 
but did not mention that the Sixth Circuit’s view was, apparently, 
in accord with the unanimous position of the handful of other 
published circuit court decisions addressing the matter—
information that comes to light only by reading the decisions 
below and the briefing.205 That is worrying because it feeds the 
suspicion that the lower courts are invoked or ignored in a stra-
tegic way. And yet, as a counterexample, there is Staub v Proctor 
Hospital,206 in which Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court 
probably could have claimed to side with the large majority of 
the lower courts but did not even mention the split.207 
 
 202 See id at 1048 (Breyer dissenting) (“[A]lmost every Court of Appeals to have con-
sidered the matter has taken the Second Circuit’s approach.”). See also Brief for the 
United States, Bailey v United States, Docket No 11-770, *22–23 (US filed Sept 20, 2012) 
(available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 4259480) (claiming uniform support from the courts of 
appeals). 
 203 Compare Kiobel, 133 S Ct at 1663 (omitting prior precedent on the question pre-
sented), with id at 1675 (Breyer concurring in the judgment) (citing several cases from 
the courts of appeals). See also text accompanying notes 11–12 (discussing Taniguchi). 
 204 131 S Ct 863 (2011). 
 205 Compare id at 867 (stating that the Court granted certiorari to review the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision, but not mentioning other circuits), with Thompson v North American 
Stainless, LP, 567 F3d 804, 811 (6th Cir 2009) (stating that the Sixth Circuit agreed with 
three other circuits and that “no circuit court of appeals” had held to the contrary); Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Thompson v North American Stainless, LP, 
Docket No 09-291, *6–7 (US filed May 25, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 
2101919) (“Thompson Amicus Brief”) (“Four courts of appeals have considered third-
party retaliation claims asserted by employees in the position of petitioner under Title 
VII or statutes with substantially identical anti-retaliation provisions, and all four have 
rejected them.”). I emphasize that judgments about the circuits’ positions are debatable. 
As the solicitor general noted, some of the decisions according with the Sixth Circuit’s 
used different rationales or involved parallel language in different discrimination stat-
utes. See Thompson Amicus Brief at *7.  
 206 131 S Ct 1186 (2011). 
 207 The Seventh Circuit, which was reversed in Staub, had taken a strict approach 
that only one other circuit embraced. See Staub Amicus Brief at *8–9. The other circuits 
were more lenient, though they used varying language, which makes it hard to give an 
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As the above discussion shows, my own investigations have 
often taken me beyond the four corners of Supreme Court opin-
ions. So why not eschew reliance on what the Court says about 
splits and instead report what is really going on? Unfortunately, 
that effort would not get at the whole truth either. Going outside 
of the Court’s opinions in order to determine the actual circuit 
breakdowns in a purported split introduces much more complex-
ity and subjectivity regarding whether decisions conflict: Are 
certain cases really in conflict or are they distinguishable? Are 
the allegedly conflicting rules dicta or holdings? Would the lower 
courts involved in a split still reach the same decisions today 
given intervening Supreme Court rulings? What about intracir-
cuit conflicts and the like? Indeed, the justices themselves some-
times disagree about the true circuit breakdown.208 Further, 
there is no clear stopping point once one departs from the four 
corners of the Court’s opinions. One cannot be certain that the 
certiorari filings are comprehensive and trustworthy. (Those 
petitioning for certiorari may exaggerate conflicts, while respon-
dents may deny or minimize them.) Lower-court opinions often 
collect cases on either side of a split, but there is no guarantee 
that those counts are accurate and complete either. One would 
have to research all of the legal questions independently, which 
is time-consuming and is by no means guaranteed to yield an ob-
jective answer. 
Because of these difficulties, one should not put too much 
faith in any purportedly precise measures of the Supreme 
Court’s resolutions of circuit splits. There are at least a few lop-
sided cases that the Court’s opinions do not reveal, though one 
should not expect very many to go unmentioned given that an 
opinion (whether for the majority or a separate opinion) that 
aligns with a lopsided lower-court majority can bolster its argu-
ment by saying so. I believe that the 62 percent figure reported 
above as the rate at which the Court agrees with lopsided lower-
 
exact circuit lineup. See id (discussing the law in various circuits). Further, because the 
Supreme Court’s opinion did not address those other circuits, it is hard to say definitively 
what the Court meant to endorse (beyond the fact that it clearly did not endorse the 
strict view). 
 208 See generally, for example, Milner v Department of the Navy, 131 S Ct 1259 
(2011). The majority insisted that the case involved a roughly even division in the lower 
courts, while the dissent accused the majority of joining the wrong side of a lopsided 
split. Compare id at 1268–69 (majority), with id at 1274 (Breyer dissenting). I have de-
ferred to the majority, so Milner is not in Table 1. If the majority had ignored the lower-
court precedent or failed to dispute the dissent’s characterization, I probably would have 
included it in the table, as with the cases discussed in the text accompanying notes 202–03. 
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court majorities more likely overestimates the Court’s agreement 
with the lower courts than underestimates it. That is because it is 
plausible to suspect that an authoring justice is more likely to 
mention and accentuate the extent of agreement with the lower 
courts than the opposite. For the same reason, there is some basis 
to worry that the rates of agreement between the Supreme 
Court and lower courts reported by other studies209 are also too 
high (and they are certainly inexact).210 
B. Invocations of the Lower Courts in the Justices’ Reasoning 
A more complete and confident understanding of the issue 
requires that we also look at what the justices say in their opin-
ions. Do they state that they are influenced by lower-court 
precedent? If so, which of the rationales explored in Part II—
stability, epistemic authority, pragmatism, and so on—do the 
justices find compelling? And which justices? 
In order to answer those questions, I attempted to identify 
and categorize every instance, over the last three Supreme 
Court terms, in which an opinion invoked or relied on the views 
of the lower courts as support for its position on the question 
presented. That does not include every instance in which a lower 
court is cited on any point of law. For example, a Supreme Court 
opinion will sometimes cite lower-court precedent on a point that 
is being assumed for purposes of argument or on a point that is 
tangential to the question actually before the Court.211 Such ref-
erences do show some appreciation for the views of the lower 
courts, but it is hard to evaluate their significance. For one 
thing, it is sometimes unclear whether an opinion is actually 
taking a position on some tangential point or merely accepting it 
arguendo. Moreover, any given question presented involves 
countless tangentially related questions on which there might 
(or might not) be a majority view that the Supreme Court might 
(or might not) decide to mention. Thus, if one finds, say, ten 
mentions of consensus on tangential points, that could be ten 
 
 209 See note 174. 
 210 For more thoughts on these issues, see generally Bruhl, 3 J Legal Metrics (cited 
in note 193). 
 211 See, for example, Gonzalez v Thaler, 132 S Ct 641, 649 n 5 (2012) (citing a lower 
court for the proposition that “[t]he courts of appeals uniformly interpret ‘circuit justice 
or judge’ to encompass district judges,” a question at most tangentially related to the 
question presented); Douglas v Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc, 
132 S Ct 1204, 1211–12 (2012) (Roberts dissenting); Pepper v United States, 131 S Ct 
1229, 1248 n 16 (2011). 
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mentions out of twenty opportunities to observe a consensus, or 
it could be ten out of one hundred opportunities. To avoid these 
and related difficulties, I report only the justices’ observations 
about what the lower courts have done with the actual question 
presented. I do, however, include the justices’ observations about 
lower-court views on what might be called “subquestions” within 
the question presented and on questions that are phrased at a 
somewhat higher level of generality than the question presented.212 
Naturally this requires some judgment calls, so the counts can-
not pretend to absolute precision. 
Table 2 summarizes the results, divided into the particular 
rationales for deference involved, along with a category for brief, 
unelaborated invocations of the lower courts and a category for 
comments rejecting reliance on lower courts as a methodological 
matter. 
 
 212 See, for example, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060, 2070 & 
n 9 (2011) (defining the “willful blindness” standard in a patent case by referring to lower-
court cases articulating the standard in other contexts). 
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TABLE 2. INVOCATIONS OF LOWER-COURT SUPPORT, GROUPED BY 
RATIONALE AND JUSTICE: 2010, 2011, AND 2012 TERMS  
Case Location of Invocation Authoring Justice 
Significant Reliance on Lower Courts without  
Emphasizing Particular Grounds   
 
Janus Capital v First De-
rivatives Traders  
131 S Ct 2296, 2311–12 
(2011) 
Breyer dissenting 
J. McIntyre Machinery v 
Nicastro 
131 S Ct 2780, 2801–02, 
2804–06 (2011) 
Ginsburg dissenting 
Epistemic   
*United States v 
 Tinklenberg 
131 S Ct 2007, 2014 
(2011) 
Breyer 
Nevada Commission on 
Ethics v Carrigan 
131 S Ct 2343, 2349 
(2011) 
Scalia 
Modest Pragmatic   
**Koontz v St. Johns River 
Water Management  
District 
133 S Ct 2586, 2602 
(2013) 
Alito 
**Vance v Ball State 
 University 
133 S Ct 2434, 2453 
(2013) 
Alito 
Johnson v Williams 133 S Ct 1088, 1097 
(2013) 
Alito 
**Bullock v 
 BankChampaign, NA 
133 S Ct 1754, 1761 
(2013) 
Breyer 
*Kiobel v Royal Dutch  
Petroleum Co 
133 S Ct 1659, 1675–77 
(2013) 
Breyer concurring 
**Henderson v United 
States 
133 S Ct 1121, 1130 
(2013) 
Breyer 
Bailey v United States 133 S Ct 1031, 1048 
(2013) 
Breyer dissenting 
Florence v Board of  
Chosen Freeholders 
132 S Ct 1510, 1530 
(2012) 
Breyer dissenting 
*United States v  
Tinklenberg 
131 S Ct 2007, 2014–15 
(2011) 
Breyer 
*Milner v Department of 
the Navy 
131 S Ct 1259, 1276 
(2011) 
Breyer dissenting 
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Los Angeles County v 
Humphries 
131 S Ct 447, 453 (2010) Breyer 
**Kirtsaeng v John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc 
133 S Ct 1351, 1389–90 
(2013) 
Ginsburg dissenting 
*Taniguchi v Kan Pacific 
Saipan, Ltd 
132 S Ct 1997, 2010–11 
(2012) 
Ginsburg dissenting 
**Mims v Arrow Financial 
Services, LLC 
132 S Ct 740, 753 (2012) Ginsburg 
*CSX Transportation, Inc 
v McBride 
131 S Ct 2630, 2641, 
2643–44 (2011) 
Ginsburg 
**Skinner v Switzer 131 S Ct 1289, 1299 
(2011) 
Ginsburg 
Martel v Clair 132 S Ct 1276, 1285, 1288 
(2012) 
Kagan 
Lafler v Cooper 132 S Ct 1376, 1385, 
1389–90 (2012) 
Kennedy 
Hosanna-Tabor v EEOC 132 S Ct 694, 705, 707, 
710 (2012) 
Roberts 
Perry v New Hampshire 132 S Ct 716, 737–38 
(2012) 
Sotomayor dissenting 
Freeman v United States 131 S Ct 2685, 2698 n 3, 
2700 n 9 (2011) 
Sotomayor concurring 
**Schindler Elevator Corp 
v United States 
131 S Ct 1885, 1894–95 
(2011) 
Thomas 
Acquiescence 
 
*Kiobel v Royal Dutch 
 Petroleum Co 
133 S Ct 1659, 1675–77 
(2013) 
Breyer concurring  
*Milner v Department of 
the Navy 
131 S Ct 1259, 1274–75 
(2011) 
Breyer dissenting 
*Taniguchi v Kan Pacific 
Saipan, Ltd 
132 S Ct 1997, 2008–09 
(2012) 
Ginsburg dissenting 
*CSX Transportation, Inc 
v McBride 
131 S Ct 2630, 2641 
(2011) 
Ginsburg 
Microsoft Corp v 
 i4i Limited Partnership 
131 S Ct 2238, 2252 
(2011) 
Sotomayora 
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Stability   
*United States v 
 Tinklenberg 
131 S Ct 2007, 2014–15 
(2011) 
Breyer 
*Milner v Department of 
the Navy 
131 S Ct 1259, 1276–78 
(2011) 
Breyer dissenting 
Maracich v Spears 133 S Ct 2191, 2222 
(2013) 
Ginsburg dissenting 
*Taniguchi v Kan Pacific 
Saipan 
132 S Ct 1997, 2008–09 
(2012) 
Ginsburg dissenting 
*CSX Transportation, Inc 
v McBride 
131 S Ct 2630, 2640–41 
(2011) 
Ginsburg  
Lozman v City of Riviera 
Beach, Florida 
133 S Ct 735, 753–55 
(2013) 
Sotomayor dissenting 
Southern Union Co v 
United States 
132 S Ct 2344, 2357 
(2012) 
Sotomayor 
Opinion Claims Support from a Majority of Lower Courts 
without Elaborationb 
  
Hosanna-Tabor v EEOC 132 S Ct 694, 714 (2012) Alito concurring 
Global-Tech Appliances, 
Inc v SEB SA 
131 S Ct 2060, 2069–70 
(2011) 
Alito 
Lozman v City of Riviera 
Beach, Florida 
133 S Ct 735, 743 (2013) Breyer 
Fowler v United States 131 S Ct 2045, 2050 
(2011) 
Breyerc 
Abbott v United States 131 S Ct 18, 23 (2010) Ginsburg 
Arizona Christian School 
v Winn 
131 S Ct 1436, 1453 
(2011) 
Kagan dissenting 
United States v Home 
Concrete 
132 S Ct 1836, 1852 
(2012) 
Kennedy dissentingd 
Florence v Board of  
Chosen Freeholders 
132 S Ct 1510, 1518 
(2012)  
Kennedye 
Coleman v Court of 
 Appeals of Maryland 
132 S Ct 1327, 1332 
(2012)  
Kennedy 
Borough of Duryea v 
Guarnieri 
131 S Ct. 2488, 2491–93, 
2495 (2011) 
Kennedy 
Harrington v Richter 131 S Ct 770, 784 (2011)  Kennedy 
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Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club v Bennett 
131 S Ct 2806, 2823 
(2011) 
Roberts 
Ransom v FIA Card  
Services, NA 
131 S Ct 716, 730 (2011) Scalia dissenting 
Cullen v Pinholster 131 S Ct 1388, 1417 
(2011) 
Sotomayor dissenting 
Sossamon v Texas 131 S Ct 1651, 1662 n 9 
(2011) 
Thomas 
Negative Comments about Relying on Lower Courts   
Milner v Department of 
the Navy 
131 S Ct 1259, 1268 
(2011) Kagan 
Global-Tech Appliances, 
Inc v SEB SA 
131 S Ct 2060, 2073 
(2011) Kennedy dissenting 
CSX Transportation, Inc v 
McBride 
131 S Ct 2630, 2650 
(2011) Roberts dissenting 
United States v 
 Tinklenberg 
131 S Ct 2007, 2018 
(2011) Scalia concurring 
* Opinion cites multiple rationales. 
** Opinion invokes the pragmatic rationale but does not clearly claim a majority of 
lower courts in support. The logic of the pragmatic rationale can apply even in the 
absence of majority support. See Part III.B.2. 
 
Notes: 
a In this case, the Court inferred congressional acquiescence in a long-standing inter-
pretation of the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction in the field. 
b Several of the cases listed in the preceding categories also contain a separate pass-
ing reference to lower-court support, but I have not included them again in this cate-
gory. This category is for cases that contain only a brief invocation of lower-court 
precedent without mentioning particular grounds for attending to lower-court views. 
c Breyer’s opinion for the Court contended that “[n]o [c]ircuit” had adopted the posi-
tion of Scalia’s concurrence, but it was not clear whether most circuits agreed with 
the Court’s own position. See Fowler v United States, 131 S Ct 2045, 2050 (2011). 
d The opinion claimed support from “several” decisions in the courts of appeals but 
did not explicitly call them a majority, so it is debatable whether to include this case. 
United States v Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S Ct 1836, 1852 (2012). It ap-
pears, based on other sources, that the “several” cases did in fact constitute a majority, 
though it was a fairly narrow one. See Brief for the Respondent, Beard v Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, Docket No 10-1553, *19–20 (US filed July 27, 2011) 
(available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 3202962). 
e Kennedy did not claim support from a majority of all of the courts of appeals but 
claimed support from all of those to have ruled on the issue in the decade leading up 
to the Court’s decision. See Florence, 132 S Ct at 1518. 
 
The results can be analyzed along several dimensions: how 
often the Supreme Court invoked the lower courts, which ra-
tionales the Court most commonly employed, and which justices 
were most likely to rely on lower-court support. 
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1. Overall frequency of use. 
Invocations of support from the lower courts are not unusual, 
but neither are they routine. Looking at the Court’s entire out-
put over the last three terms, one finds invocations of the lower 
courts in about forty cases, or around one-sixth of the merits 
decisions. For comparison, that is more often than the Supreme 
Court cited The Federalist (seventeen citing cases) or Blackstone’s 
Commentaries (eighteen citing cases) during the same period.213 
Of course, comparing citation rates has limited value, because 
different types of sources are potentially relevant in different 
cases. The Federalist is not a plausible source for most ERISA 
cases, and the weight of lower-court opinion is not available 
when there is no clear majority view. 
Not all invocations of the lower courts are equal. In around 
one-third of the cases invoking lower-court support, the discus-
sion is brief and unelaborated; at the minimal end, it may 
amount to nothing more than a passing mention of agreement 
with the majority of the lower courts.214 Such mentions show 
that the Court is part of a larger judicial enterprise, but they do 
not necessarily reflect that the opinion even purports to give 
lower-court views any weight as authority. In the remaining 
two-thirds of the invocations of the lower courts, the views of the 
lower courts are presented as having more value: the opinion ei-
ther mentions lower-court views repeatedly with a suggestion 
that some weight is given, or the invocation of the lower courts 
is tied to some particular reason to care about what the lower 
courts think. 
It is striking how many of the invocations of lower-court ma-
jorities appear in dissents. This provides more evidence that the 
lower courts have at best modest influence on the Supreme 
Court. Many of these dissents were authored by the Court’s lib-
erals, which suggests a connection to interpretive methodology 
and ideology more broadly, a topic discussed again shortly.215 
 
 213 This statement is based on a search of the Westlaw Supreme Court database for 
“Federalist” and “Blackstone” for the period October 2010 through June 2013. Some false 
positives were excluded (such as references to “federalist principles” or business entities 
with “Blackstone” in the name). 
 214 See, for example, Coleman, 132 S Ct at 1332 (“In agreement with every Court of 
Appeals to have addressed this question, this Court now holds . . .”). 
 215 See Part III.B.3. 
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2. Different rationales for relying on the lower courts. 
By far the most common basis for invoking the lower 
courts—among the cases with more than passing references—
was the pragmatic rationale. That argument posits that, once 
the lower courts have created a certain state of the law, the 
Supreme Court can observe the consequences that flow from it; 
if no terrible consequences appear, the Court has reason to prefer 
that state of affairs to a less tested alternative.216 Justice Breyer’s 
fondness for this sort of reasoning is not surprising given his 
embrace of evaluating practical consequences as one aspect of 
sound judicial decisionmaking.217 But, as these results show, 
other members of the current Court, even more formalist justices, 
also incorporate consequences into their reasoning.218 
Before getting carried away with the surprising prevalence 
of pragmatism, one should remember that one characteristic of 
the pragmatic rationale uniquely inflates its incidence in the 
Court’s opinions. In particular, the logic of modest pragmatism, 
unlike that of other rationales, makes sense whether or not one’s 
favored position has been adopted by most of the courts to have 
addressed the matter. As long as some critical mass of courts 
has adopted a particular view for a while, one can plausibly ad-
vance the argument that any seriously negative consequences 
inherent in that view would have manifested themselves. Table 
2 uses two asterisks to indicate cases in which an opinion invokes 
the pragmatic argument without claiming that the opinion’s 
preferred interpretation of the law represents a clear majority 
position. In some cases, it is a narrow majority view, though in a 
few it is actually a minority view. Still, the pragmatic rationale 
remains the most popular even without those cases. 
Another feature that may help to explain pragmatism’s 
relative prevalence is that it can serve as a rebuttal to a conse-
quentialist argument from the briefs or an opposing opinion. 
That is, if one opinion says that a certain interpretation will 
 
 216 See Part II.B. 
 217 See Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View 82 (Knopf 
2010) (describing his approach as “pragmatic—as that concept is broadly used to encom-
pass efforts that consider and evaluate consequences”). 
 218 See Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation of 
Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 Miss L J 129, 
173–80, 188–89 (2008) (showing that Scalia frequently relies on consequentialist argu-
ments and his sense of statutory purposes); Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 
Brooklyn L Rev 1007, 1009, 1012–15 (2011) (explaining that consequentialist arguments 
are common even among textualists). 
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have bad consequences, that charge can be rebutted by showing 
that the interpretation has already been tried out and has, in 
fact, not been so bad after all.219 Thus, an opinion’s author might 
use the pragmatic argument defensively in response to actual or 
anticipated counterarguments. 
Although the stability/reliance argument for following the 
lower courts figures prominently in the scholarly commentary,220 
it appears only rarely in the cases that I examined. Perhaps that 
is because, as proposed above, the argument is most forceful in 
cases that do not regularly appear on the Supreme Court’s docket 
(for example, when there is a long-standing consensus on a 
question that engenders serious reliance interests).221 
The last three years also saw few opinions citing the acqui-
escence rationale, which is the notion that one can infer congres-
sional approval from the failure to legislatively override long-
standing and unequivocal lower-court precedent. Acquiescence 
arguments used to be more common, and their decline can be 
traced to two factors. The first is the appointment of Justice 
Scalia to the Supreme Court.222 His brand of textualism makes 
him a committed opponent of arguments that draw inferences 
from congressional silence.223 His views have perhaps proved 
persuasive to some of his colleagues and, in any event, his will-
ingness to write a separate opinion objecting to such argu-
ments224 may dissuade hassle-averse opinion writers from in-
cluding them even when the writer finds them compelling.225 
Second, and more recently, the departure of Justice Stevens 
 
 219 See, for example, Vance v Ball State University, 133 S Ct 2434, 2452–54 (2013). 
See also David S. Law and David Zaring, Law versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and 
the Use of Legislative History, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev 1653, 1736–38 (2010) (finding that 
citation to legislative history in a Supreme Court opinion is correlated with the presence of 
citations to legislative history in another opinion in the same case—a “tit-for-tat” effect). 
 220 See text accompanying notes 112–14. 
 221 See Part II.D. 
 222 Writing twenty-five years ago, Eskridge noted that then-recently appointed Justice 
Scalia’s criticisms of inaction arguments had already significantly raised the tempera-
ture of the debate over using acquiescence and related arguments. See Eskridge, 87 Mich 
L Rev at 67–68, 92 & n 152 (cited in note 99). 
 223 For one of his particularly vehement early statements against imputing acquies-
cence, see Johnson v Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 US 
616, 671–72 (1987) (Scalia dissenting). 
 224 See, for example, Jerman v Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S 
Ct 1605, 1625–26 (2010) (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 225 A similar dynamic may be at work in the Court’s use of legislative history, an-
other Scalia-disfavored interpretive resource. See James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear, 
Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Ef-
fect, 29 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 117, 160–71 (2008).  
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means that the Court has lost one of its chief supporters of 
acquiescence arguments.226 
3. Differences among the justices and the role of 
interpretive methodology. 
The justices’ propensity to rely on the lower courts tends, 
roughly, to track their overall political ideologies. Although nei-
ther side of the Court is monolithic, the more conservative jus-
tices mostly do not invoke lower-court consensus for support, 
while the more liberal justices tend to cite it more frequently. 
Moreover, there is some evidence that the liberals’ statements 
are not just cheap talk. Referring back to Table 1, recall that 
there were instances in which a significant number of justices 
sided with the lower-court consensus despite ideological inclina-
tions that would be expected to pull them in the other direction. 
In the majority of those instances it was the Court’s liberal 
members who voted against type, which is consistent with some 
prior research.227 
If there is in fact a tendency for the liberals to be influenced 
by lower-court precedent more than the conservatives—and I 
emphasize again the measurement difficulties that plague the 
study of circuit splits—what would explain that difference? 
There are a number of possibilities, some of which involve indi-
vidual idiosyncrasies or historical contingencies,228 but one can 
construct a plausible explanation that links the difference to the 
underlying interpretive commitments of the two groups. The 
Court’s conservatives tend to be originalist in constitutional cases, 
but lower courts mostly parse the Court’s holdings and dicta; 
moreover, when the lower courts do undertake originalist re-
search, it is unlikely to be very persuasive.229 To the extent that 
some prevailing constitutional doctrine is still the product of 
prior, more liberal eras of jurisprudence (like the Warren Court), 
the conservatives would also be more willing to overrule precedent, 
 
 226 For prominent examples of Stevens’s invocation of acquiescence, see Morrison v 
National Australia Bank Ltd, 130 S Ct 2869, 2890–91 (2010) (Stevens concurring in the 
judgment); Central Bank of Denver, NA v First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA, 511 US 
164, 196–98 (1994) (Stevens dissenting). 
 227 See note 186 and accompanying text. 
 228 For instance, it may be that the length of one’s prior service on a lower court in-
creases one’s receptivity to following the lower courts. That explanation has some appeal, 
though it cannot explain all of the data points (Kennedy, for example, served for more 
than a decade on the Ninth Circuit). 
 229 See text accompanying notes 146–50.  
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further distancing them from lower courts, which lack that op-
tion. In statutory interpretation, the conservatives are more 
likely to believe in the primacy, even the exclusivity, of the en-
acted text. And although one might suppose that the lower 
courts could serve as reliable interpreters of the ordinary meaning 
of language, such that they would usually reach the correct in-
terpretation, the brand of textualism actually practiced by those 
like Justice Scalia is extremely complex: it eventually finds 
“clear” meanings, but the route to clarity involves complicated 
“whole code” reasoning that may be anything but obvious.230 The 
Court’s more liberal members, by contrast, are more open to 
ambiguity and evolving meanings, and they tend to be method-
ologically eclectic. Just as they are willing to depart from the 
most linguistically obvious reading of text in the name of purpose 
or intent or policy, they can also find a place in their methodology 
to let semantics yield to lower-court consensus, which reflects 
settled practices (stability) and passes the test of workability 
(modest pragmatism). 
It is interesting to juxtapose the conservatives’ relative in-
difference to lower-court precedent with the professed textualist 
aim of reading texts (particularly statutes) so as to make the law 
as coherent and consistent as possible.231 The conservatives evi-
dently believe that the goal of coherence is better achieved not 
through consistency with lower-court decisions, but by drawing 
on broader, background principles of law, often those rooted in 
the common law. That is, they appear to prioritize what Professor 
Anita Krishnakumar has called “landscape coherence,” even 
when doing so may be suboptimal for the particular question at 
hand.232 A nice illustration comes from CSX Transportation, Inc 
v McBride,233 which concerned the standard of causation under 
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act234 (FELA). The majority 
opinion by Justice Ginsburg relied heavily on the fact that the 
 
 230 Bruhl, 97 Cornell L Rev at 442–43, 477–78 (cited in note 45) (explaining that, for 
Scalia, the linguistic frame of reference is the entire US Code, not just the particular act 
at issue). 
 231 See Green v Bock Laundry Machine Co, 490 US 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia concurring 
in the judgment) (stating that statutory terms should be read so as to be “most compatible 
with the surrounding body of law”). See also Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: 
Federal Courts and the Law 17 (Princeton 1997) (referring to integrating a statute with 
“the remainder of the corpus juris”). 
 232 Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: 
An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 Hastings L J 221, 221, 225–26 (2010). 
 233 131 S Ct 2630 (2011). 
 234 45 USC § 51 et seq. 
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vast majority of lower courts had understood the standard in a 
particular way for decades.235 The dissent, authored by Chief 
Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Alito, Scalia, and Kennedy, 
relied from beginning to end on a different source of wisdom: 
“accumulated common law history” in the form of the “enduring 
common law concept” of proximate cause.236 One would suppose 
that the lower-court cases concerning FELA causation would 
have considered that common law background too, along with 
more statute-specific factors, and yet the dissent largely by-
passed those on-point decisions in order to appeal to broader 
principles that pervade the general law of torts.237 In this sort of 
case, the conservatives’ preference for continuity with the com-
mon law and general background principles is hard to defend 
from the point of view of the deeper rule-of-law values like pre-
dictability that one would expect them to invoke. 
The correspondence between ideology and attitudes toward 
lower-court precedent is certainly not perfect. Although it is too 
early to form firm conclusions about her methodological commit-
ments, Justice Kagan seems less interested in relying on the lower 
courts than her colleagues on the Court’s liberal wing or her prede-
cessor, Justice Stevens.238 Her opinions dutifully note circuit splits 
(and, as the most junior justice, she probably receives more than 
her fair share of complicated-but-dry statutory cases), but so far 
she rarely purports to give weight to lower-court views or explain 
why their views might be worthy of deference.239 Further, she 
joined the conservatives in the text-trumps-long-standing-practice 
 
 235 See McBride, 131 S Ct at 2634, 2640–41. 
 236 Id at 2644–45, 2652 (Roberts dissenting). Justice Thomas joined the majority 
opinion in part. 
 237 Staub presents another example of using lower courts to provide background 
guidance rather than specific guidance. Scalia’s opinion for the Court cited several lower-
court cases from unrelated contexts in order to divine general principles of agency law. 
See Staub, 131 S Ct at 1191–92. The opinion did not cite the many lower-court cases that 
had addressed the particular Title VII issue before the Court. See note 197. 
 238 We have only a few years in which to observe, and the sample size for Kagan is 
further reduced because she recused herself from about one-third of the cases in her first 
term, October Term 2010. Stephen Wermiel, Justice Kagan’s Recusals, SCOTUSblog 
(Oct 9, 2012), online at http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/scotus-for-law-students 
-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-justice-kagans-recusals (visited Aug 12, 2014).  
 239 Apart from the two cases noted in Table 2, there are a few instances in which 
Kagan (like her colleagues) cites lower courts as authorities on points tangential to the 
question presented. See, for example, US Airways, Inc v McCutchen, 133 S Ct 1537, 1550 
n 8 (2013) (Kagan). See also National Meat Association v Harris, 132 S Ct 965, 974 
(2012) (Kagan) (citing and distinguishing lower-court cases). 
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opinion in Taniguchi.240 And although Milner v Department of the 
Navy241 was decided by a vote of 8–1, with only Justice Breyer 
championing the DC Circuit’s long-standing-but-textually-
tenuous interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act,242 
Kagan’s majority opinion not only disputed Breyer’s contention 
that the DC Circuit’s view had commanded widespread approval 
in many lower courts but, before doing that, claimed that Breyer’s 
position “would be immaterial even if true, because we have no 
warrant to ignore clear statutory language on the ground that 
other courts have done so.”243 In some sense she is of course cor-
rect, but the statement does present things in quite a stark, 
black-and-white way. 
Among the more conservative justices, Scalia appears par-
ticularly opposed to crediting the views of the lower courts. 
When he does mention lower-court precedent, it is often to ex-
plicitly reject the soundness of following it.244 As noted above, his 
opinions often do not even reveal that there is a split, which is 
unhelpful. To his credit, he does not appear to be opportunistic 
about mentioning lower courts: I found several instances in 
which he neglects to mention lower-court views even when he is 
apparently following a lower-court majority.245 
Scalia did rely on lower courts in a significant, albeit unusual, 
way in Nevada Commission on Ethics v Carrigan.246 The Nevada 
Supreme Court had invalidated on First Amendment grounds a 
state law requiring state legislators to recuse themselves from 
votes in which they had a conflict of interest.247 The US Supreme 
Court reversed.248 Scalia’s opinion for the Court observed that 
“[t]he Nevada Supreme Court and [the respondent] have not cited 
a single decision invalidating a generally applicable conflict-of-
interest recusal rule—and such rules have been commonplace 
 
 240 See Taniguchi, 132 S Ct at 1999. See also text accompanying notes 153–59. 
 241 131 S Ct 1259 (2011). 
 242 5 USC § 552. 
 243 Milner, 131 S Ct at 1268 (emphasis added). 
 244 For notable examples from before the period covered by this study, see Morrison, 
130 S Ct at 2878–81; Brogan v United States, 522 US 398, 407–08 (1998). 
 245 See generally, for example, Smith, 544 US 228; City of Arlington, 133 S Ct 1863; 
Staub, 131 S Ct 1186. In each of these instances, I am following the solicitor general’s 
characterization of the split. In Staub, the circuit split was arguably not even close, such 
that it would have been tempting to mention that fact. See note 207. 
 246 131 S Ct 2343 (2011). 
 247 Id at 2346. 
 248 Id at 2352. 
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for over 200 years.”249 Relying on old state court cases, old stat-
utes, and other materials, Scalia’s opinion revealed a tradition of 
regulating legislators, a tradition sufficient to approve the chal-
lenged law’s constitutionality.250 In fact, Scalia found the old 
cases and sources more persuasive as authorities than some 
more recent decisions “from the 1980’s and afterwards” that the 
respondent relied on.251 This perhaps makes sense for a constitu-
tional originalist: old decisions have greater epistemic value be-
cause they were closer to the relevant original understandings. 
One can contrast Justice Scalia’s fairly dependable disre-
gard of the lower courts with the less consistent stance taken by 
some other members of the Court. For example, Justice Kennedy 
has quite often mentioned, in passing, that his view accords with 
the majority (or all) of the lower courts.252 But the lower-court 
decisions do not appear to be doing much work in his reasoning, 
for he does not linger to explain the significance of such agreement 
(stability, congressional acquiescence, deference to expertise, 
and so forth), and he has authored or joined opinions that explicitly 
reject reliance on lower-court consensus as an interpretive 
method.253 
CONCLUSION: PRECEDENT, EQUILIBRIUM, AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
This Article has considered how lower-court precedent does 
and should figure into the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking. Yet 
the cases that make their way onto the Supreme Court’s merits 
docket represent just a small fraction of the judiciary’s business. 
This Article concludes by considering the role of lower-court 
precedent from a more systemic perspective. Doing so generates 
some interesting implications and points the way toward some 
fruitful topics for further investigation. 
To begin with, the use of lower-court precedent provides an 
example of how judicial decisionmaking differs substantially 
across courts. Lower-court precedent enjoys at most modest in-
fluence on the Supreme Court, but it looms large within the lower 
 
 249 Id at 2348. 
 250 See Nevada Commission on Ethics, 131 S Ct at 2347–49. 
 251 Id at 2349. 
 252 See Table 2. 
 253 See, for example, Global-Tech Appliances, 131 S Ct at 2073 (Kennedy dissenting) 
(“[C]ounting courts in a circuit split is not this Court’s usual method for deciding impor-
tant questions of law.”). 
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courts themselves. The federal courts of appeals are not formally 
bound by out-of-circuit precedents, yet they give them serious 
consideration and some degree of authority. Lower courts fre-
quently make statements to the effect that they are reluctant to 
create or exacerbate a split of authority absent good reason.254 
Probably the main justification for the circuits to give weight to 
one another’s precedents is the promotion of geographic uniform-
ity.255 Nationally uniform application of federal law promotes the 
equal treatment of similarly situated parties, facilitates the op-
erations of multistate actors, and fosters predictability.256 Al-
though there may be reasons for the Supreme Court to follow 
lower courts in certain situations, promoting geographic uni-
formity is generally not one of them, as whatever decision the 
Court makes will (at least in theory) be uniform throughout the 
land.257 
Thus, we currently have a system in which the lower courts 
tend to follow a model of horizontal coordination while the 
Supreme Court mostly charts its own course. Is that the best 
way to run a judicial system? From the perspective of institu-
tional design, one could imagine quite different possibilities, in-
cluding some systems that essentially flip those two tendencies. 
For example, perhaps the lower courts should act more inde-
pendently, exercising their own best judgment rather than 
showing deference to others. If they did so, that would increase 
the value of their views on the epistemic rationale, which in turn 
would give the Supreme Court some additional reason to honor 
the majority view that emerged, thus creating a quite different 
system than we have now. But let us suppose, as seems more 
likely, that we retain a system broadly like our own, in which 
lower courts value persuasive precedent much more highly than 
 
 254 See, for example, Admiral Financial Corp v United States, 378 F3d 1336, 1340 
(Fed Cir 2004) (“[W]e do not create conflicts among the circuits without strong cause.”) 
(quotation marks omitted); United States v Auginash, 266 F3d 781, 784 (8th Cir 2001). 
See also Klein, Making Law at 89–91 (cited in note 42). 
 255 See, for example, James v Sunrise Hospital, 86 F3d 885, 889 (9th Cir 1996) (observing 
that “we have been much influenced in the construction we adopt by the desire to avoid 
intercircuit conflict” and that “there is virtue in uniformity of federal law as construed by 
the federal circuits”). 
 256 But see Frost, 94 Va L Rev at 1579–1606 (cited in note 16) (summarizing and criti-
cally assessing the various arguments that are offered in support of geographic uniformity). 
 257 An exception to the statement that the Supreme Court need not worry about geo-
graphic uniformity arises in connection with the interpretation of treaties. Maintaining 
uniform understandings on such matters has value in itself. See Abbott v Abbott, 560 US 
1, 16 (2010). 
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does the Supreme Court. Some interesting practical and theoretical 
problems arise from this divergence. 
Perhaps most importantly, the divergence raises questions 
about how to maintain systemic stability. Surprisingly, the 
system can actually work pretty well—despite the differences 
between courts—if each level plays its role properly. By giving 
sister circuits’ decisions a degree of deference and showing a 
willingness to reconsider old circuit law that is out of step with 
an emerging consensus, the lower courts can mostly maintain 
uniformity all by themselves. Some splits will (and should) de-
velop, of course, but a wise administration of the Court’s certio-
rari policy would tolerate some harmless splits (for example, local 
procedural variations that do not threaten substantial rights). 
For the rare question that proves to be both divisive and 
important, the Court can step in. When it does so, it can usually 
use the blank slate approach because, as Part II explains, most 
situations that require the Court’s attention do not strongly im-
plicate the values potentially served by downward deference. 
Thus, even if the Supreme Court rejects the view that had pre-
vailed in the majority of the lower courts, the system will usually 
work just fine. 
Trouble can enter the system from either end. Sometimes 
there will be good reasons for the Supreme Court to defer to 
lower-court consensus on the merits, but it will fail to do so. 
Other times the Court might unnecessarily disrupt the system 
by granting certiorari when it should not. Consider in this re-
gard the case of Taniguchi, the translation-fees dispute dis-
cussed above.258 Most of the lower courts had allowed prevailing 
plaintiffs to recover translation expenses as part of the costs of 
the litigation, but the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court’s 
merits decision, had it been the first word on the subject, would 
have been fine enough, though it did compromise Congress’s 
purpose in the name of a textual reading that was probably not 
compelled. But Taniguchi might represent one of those instances 
in which various considerations—stability concerns stemming 
from the fact that many lower courts had allowed translation 
expenses and even enacted local rules to that effect, epistemic 
deference to the lower courts’ expertise in litigation procedure, 
and so on—should have led the Court to follow the bulk of lower-
court precedent.259 Perhaps even more importantly, it is unclear 
 
 258 See text accompanying notes 153–59. 
 259 See text accompanying notes 157–59. 
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why the Court needed to hear the case at all. The question at issue 
was the sort of procedural detail that can vary across circuits 
without doing substantial harm. 
The lower courts can also cause trouble, especially when 
they mistake the Supreme Court’s blank slate approach for the 
approach that they should take. When a lower court breaks from 
its peers for the sake of pursuing a “better” interpretation—
often, these days, in the name of textualism—that can upset the 
whole system. It would be valuable to know more about how 
lower-court interpretive methodology affects the creation of cir-
cuit splits, for such work might shed light on the systemic costs 
and benefits of various interpretive approaches as practiced in 
the lower courts. For example, it may be that Professors 
Eskridge and Frickey’s indictment of stability-flouting textualism 
in the Supreme Court applies just as well—or indeed better—to 
textualism in the lower courts.260  
In the meantime, for an illustration of what one might un-
cover, consider a Fifth Circuit case concerning the proper inter-
pretation of the Packers and Stockyards Act.261 One provision of 
the statute prohibits meatpackers from engaging in certain con-
duct, as described in several distinct subsections.262 Three of 
those subsections outlaw conduct only when it has an anticom-
petitive effect on the market or restrains commerce.263 But two 
other subsections, in apparent contrast, refer merely to unfair, 
deceptive, or discriminatory practices, without mentioning any 
harm to the market at large.264 One might therefore suppose, on 
textual grounds, that these two subsections reach the specified 
injurious conduct whether or not it has any broader anticom-
petitive effect; their text does not expressly require any mar-
ket effect, and that omission seems especially meaningful in 
light of the language of the neighboring subsections. Indeed, 
that is how the Fifth Circuit panel majority saw it, and the court 
therefore allowed a plaintiff to sue based on individual injury 
without proving anticompetitive effects.265 
 
 260 See text accompanying note 170. 
 261 7 USC § 181 et seq. See also generally Wheeler v Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 536 F3d 
455 (5th Cir 2008) (“Wheeler I”); Wheeler v Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 591 F3d 355 (5th Cir 
2009) (en banc) (“Wheeler II”). 
 262 See 7 USC § 192. 
 263 See 7 USC § 192(c)–(e). 
 264 See 7 USC § 192(a)–(b). 
 265 See Wheeler I, 536 F3d at 456. 
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What made the case hard was that several courts of appeals, 
relying largely on legislative history and the statute’s antitrust 
background, had previously read all of the subsections as requiring 
proof of anticompetitive impact on the market.266 According to the 
Fifth Circuit panel majority, those prior courts had fallen into 
error by deviating from the plain text.267 
The Fifth Circuit then ordered rehearing en banc and reversed 
course.268 Most interesting here is the crux of the en banc opin-
ion’s reasoning: 
The law rules best by being predictable and consistent. It is 
predictability that enables people to plan their investments 
and conduct, that encourages respect for law and its officials 
by treating citizens equally, and that enables an adversary 
to settle conflict without going to court in the hope of finding 
judges who will choose a favored result. . . . 
How then would an informed person predict the case before 
us to be decided? He would begin by expecting us to look to 
the opinions of other circuits for persuasive guidance, al-
ways chary to create a circuit split. . . . [H]e could not expect 
a judge to interpret the statute by looking only at the bare 
words of [the subsections at issue]. Surely he would predict 
that the next court judgment would be consistent with the 
judgments of the other circuits.269 
The en banc majority thus appealed to cardinal rule-of-law values 
like predictability in order to follow not text, but instead non-
binding precedent. 
What is the predictability-minded jurist to do when con-
fronted with a conflict between text and nonbinding precedent? 
There may not be a right answer to these sorts of questions,270 
 
 266 See id at 460–61. 
 267 Id at 461 (“[O]ur sister Circuits have fallen into the very legislative history pit-
fall that the Supreme Court identified.”). 
 268 Wheeler II, 591 F3d at 357. 
 269 Id at 363. A concurrence contended that the text also supported this result, at 
least if read in the proper historical context and in light of prior judicial constructions of 
similar language in other statutes. See id at 364 (Jones concurring). 
 270 The separate matter of the tension between original meaning and precedent in 
the context of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisionmaking has spawned a volu-
minous literature, and it is fair to say that no consensus has emerged. For a few con-
trasting positions, see generally Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original 
Meaning: Not As Radical As It Sounds, 22 Const Comment 257 (2005); Daniel A. Farber, 
The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 Minn L Rev 1173 (2006); Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, 
and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U Pa J Const L 155 (2006).  
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but cases such as this illustrate the possibility that no answer 
can exist independent of one’s position in the judicial hierarchy. 
According to the en banc opinion, the predictability-minded 
judge should follow sister-circuit precedent instead of “the bare 
words” of the text.271 That may well be right, in a lower court. 
Yet one cannot help but speculate that, were the Supreme Court 
ever to address the question that was before the Fifth Circuit, 
the Court might well come out the other way, relying largely on 
the type of textual argument that persuaded the original Fifth 
Circuit panel, despite all of the lower-court precedent to the con-
trary. Of course, the Supreme Court is unlikely to take up the 
issue as long as the lower courts remain in agreement. The 
precedent-following but text-defying lower court is correct, if it 
is correct, not because it has anticipated how the Supreme Court 
would rule. Rather, it is correct because its adherence to prece-
dent prevents the Supreme Court review that might result in a 
reversal.  
* * * 
Parts II and III presented an examination, along normative 
and positive dimensions, of the Supreme Court’s use of lower-
court precedent. This Conclusion, which traced some further imp-
lications, has been necessarily tentative. But I hope that it shows 
the value of studying how methodological choices made at different 
levels of the system do and should differ and, even more impor-
tantly, how those choices interact. There is much to discover 
about even familiar topics like precedent, and it is easier to 
identify new insights when one takes a step back and looks at 
the judicial system as a whole. 
 
 
 271 Wheeler II, 591 F3d at 363. 
